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Hazard Vulnerability in Socio-economic Context: An Example from Ecuador
Lucille Richards Lane
ABSTRACT

How people perceive the risks associated with natural hazards contributes
to their willingness to take protective action. Such action may be constrained by
prevailing socio-economic and place-specific conditions that restrict or inform the
choice of protective measures available to the individual. Vulnerability to the
impacts of extreme geophysical events increases when the range of alternatives
is limited or misinformed.
Many evacuees from a potentially violent volcanic eruption in Ecuador
returned to their home town of Baños while it was still under an evacuation order
in 2000 and considered to be a high risk area by officials. The research
examined four main questions: (1) What economic conditions confronted Baños
evacuees? (2) What political or other social events occurred while they were
evacuated that limited their perceived range of options? (3) What information was
available about prior eruptions of the volcano and other local natural hazards?
and (4) What were the characteristics of the economic base of Baños? These
questions were investigated using data from interviews with evacuees,
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government and non-governmental officials, census and other statistical
information, scholarly texts and newspaper reports.
The research suggests that economic conditions made it extremely
difficult for people to relocate to other communities. When a violent eruption did
not occur immediately, and few direct impacts of the eruptions were experienced
in Baños, many people chose to return home in an effort to reestablish
themselves economically. These people perceived the volcano hazard in Baños
to be far less threatening than the economic destitution associated with
evacuation. This perception may have been influenced by factors other than the
socio-economic context, including efforts of political leaders and tourist business
owners to effect the town’s economic recovery. These efforts included an
aggressive publicity campaign that minimized the risk posed by the volcano.
Besides encouraging tourists to return, the campaign also encouraged evacuees
to do so. Finally, among some residents, religious beliefs may have contributed
to perceptions that they would not be harmed in the event of an explosive
eruption.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Natural Hazards and Developing Countries
Economic losses from natural disasters are greatest in the world’s more
prosperous nations but these events kill more people and have more long-term
economic consequences for people living in countries of medium and low human
development (IFRC, 2001; Smith, 1996). This is not attributable to a higher
incidence of disasters in these countries. It is due in great part to the socioeconomic context in which the physical hazard occurs (Hewitt, 1997; Smith,
1996). This context can make populations more vulnerable to the effects of
disaster.
According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC, 2002), the root causes of disasters are frequently poverty and
development that is not sustainable. The Secretary General of the United
Nations noted in 1999: “Ninety per cent of disaster victims worldwide live in
developing countries, where poverty and population pressures force growing
numbers of poor people to live in harm’s way…”(Annan, 1999). The most recent
data from the IFRC (2002) continue to support this statement.
The problems identified by the IFRC are generally the result of the
political, economic, and social conditions that exist in a particular country.
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These conditions may also reflect the nation’s relationships with other countries
(Susman et al., 1983). Ecuador is a country of medium human development with
an economy that has depended for about three decades on price-volatile
petroleum exports as its main source of revenue. Ecuador is also a relatively
2

small country, with an area of 283,560 km , about the size of the state of
Nevada, and subject to many natural hazards, some of them catastrophic in
human and economic terms. For example, an El Niño event in 1997-1998
caused damages estimated at 14.5 percent of 1998 GDP (World Bank, 2001).
The weather disturbance killed about 200 people, damaged approximately
15,000 homes, many of them in low-income neighborhoods, and resulted in
widespread loss of jobs. The initial disaster was compounded by a dramatic
decrease in food production due to the havoc caused by flooding in agricultural
areas (World Bank, 2001).
The number of hazards studies undertaken in developing countries is
growing rapidly, but the socio-economic context in which these events occur is
still under-researched. Geographers were among the first to examine hazards
across a variety of cultures. Gilbert White and other researchers in the 1960s
and 70s were pioneers in the field. White and his colleagues were mostly
interested in examining hazard perception and the choices that individuals and
communities made in order to manage or adjust to the hazard. The research
was conducted in several different countries (White, 1974). Geographers have
also been in the forefront of studies that emphasized the importance of the socioeconomic context in which hazards occur (Alexander, 2000; Burton, Kates and
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White, 1993; Cutter, 1994; Hewitt, 1983 and 1997). At least two multidisciplinary
teams that included a geographer have made a study of the vulnerability of
communities to volcanic hazards: Dibben and Chester (1999) studied the
evolution of the economy of Furnas on the volcanic island of São Miguel in the
Azores, and Tobin and Whiteford (2001, 2002) and Whiteford et al. (2002) have
been studying hazard vulnerability within a health context in Ecuador. Such
studies, however, are still uncommon. In the case of Ecuador, there is ample
space for more geographical studies on the subject of vulnerability to natural
hazards.
This thesis is an attempt to examine, within a geographical framework,
aspects of the socio-economic context that prevailed in Ecuador when a volcano
in the central highlands became active after many years of quiescence. It is
theorized that context helped to shape hazard perceptions and contributed to the
vulnerability of individuals displaced by the eruptions. The research concentrates
primarily on the people and conditions in one community, Baños, and relates the
physical hazard event and local socio-economic context to socio-economic
events at the national level. Most of the events or conditions researched were
identified as important crises in their lives by individuals who had been evacuated
from areas around Tungurahua Volcano when it seemed likely that it would erupt
violently. Other topics were suggested because of the economic dependence of
Baños on tourism, and aspects of its history and geographical location.

3

Baños and Tungurahua Volcano
Baños, along with other communities at risk, was evacuated on October
16, 1999. The Ecuadorian government and local and international NGOs had
potentially between 20,000 and 24,000 evacuees to house, feed and assist in
finding employment. Only a fraction of the total, however, sought assistance in
the government shelters. Most people tried to survive in whatever manner they
could: living temporarily with relatives or friends, renting living space, or simply
making a home for themselves on the streets of nearby towns. It was a harsh
world to have to try to survive in because economic conditions in Ecuador were
dire for all but the wealthiest. For the evacuees, displaced and dispossessed,
the economic challenges must have seemed insurmountable. The government
was in no position to be of any great assistance because it was essentially
bankrupt and three months after the evacuation, the president was deposed in a
coup d’état.
Economic conditions for the country at large continued to deteriorate
dramatically in the weeks following the evacuation. When the volcano did not
erupt explosively as expected, and government assistance faltered, a movement
developed to return to Baños. In January 2000, the town was reoccupied by
several thousand people. Business and political leaders then embarked on a
campaign to reactivate tourism, the town’s economic base. Although officially
Baños remained under the evacuation order until the end of August 2000, the
effort to attract tourists gained momentum. By January 2001 there were signs
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that the effort was beginning to pay off and eventually, by early 2002, Baños
appeared to have regained much of its pre-evacuation activity.
Mount Tungurahua, however, continued its eruptive cycle and to present a
high risk to the community located at its base. Due in great part to the physical
characteristics of its location, Baños would be difficult, if not impossible to
evacuate successfully on short notice, the kind of notice the volcano had given in
prior historical eruptions. Regardless, for many reasons, some of which are
suggested in this research, some ten thousand people returned to live in this
hazardous environment.

Organization of the Chapters
This thesis, therefore, examines the effects of the volcanic hazard on the
town of Baños, how people in the community perceived the hazard, and some
factors, including socio-economic events and historical occurrences, which might
have contributed to shaping perception.
•

Chapter 2 reviews the hazards literature on individual perception of
volcanic hazards, evacuation, tourism, vulnerability and
marginalization, and states the hypotheses and research questions;

•

Chapter 3 outlines the methodology, which included analysis at three
levels: that of the individual, of the community, and of the nation;

•

Chapter 4 covers the physical and human geography of the study site.
Topography, principal rivers, climate and soils of the area around
Tungurahua Volcano are described. Selected demographics of the
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Canton of Baños are presented, and the political and economic
geography of the town of Baños is summarized.
•

Chapter 5 describes the current spatial and temporal distribution of
hazards from Tungurahua Volcano, and the historical record is
summarized. The chapter also provides a brief history of major natural
hazards in the general area of the volcano and a list of significant
hazards that occurred in Ecuador between September 1999 and
December 2001.

•

Chapter 6 recounts the mandatory evacuation and dispersal of the
inhabitants of Baños, the return of many people before the evacuation
order was lifted and how they and their leaders effected the economic
recovery of the town.

•

Chapter 7 shows the economic dependence of Baños on tourism and
traces the development of religious and secular tourism to the area.

•

Chapter 8 focuses on the socio-economic context in which the hazard
and evacuation occurred. The country’s general economic situation is
described and selected economic indicators are presented. Data are
also provided on the extent of social unrest that accompanied the
economic crisis.

•

Chapter 9 provides conclusions and a timeline showing the
concurrence of volcanic and other hazards, and of political, economic
and social events. Month-by-month data on inflation and cost of living
are included in the economic section.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
There is an extensive body of knowledge on individual perception and its
effects on response to hazards. This research has contributed to our
understanding of how people at risk behave under conditions of uncertainty
(Burton, Kates and White, 1993; Lindell and Perry, 1992; Mileti, Drabek and
Haas, 1975; Palm, 1990). The subset of perception and response to volcanic
hazards is necessarily more limited but this area also has received considerable
research attention and has contributed to how emergency agencies manage
human response to volcanic hazards (Blong, 1984; Crandell, Mullineaux and
Miller, 1979; Greene, Perry and Lindell, 1981; Mileti et al., 1991; Newhall and
Punongbayan, 1996; Perry and Lindell, 1990).
Much of the early research on perception, however, paid comparatively
little attention to the social, political or economic context in which hazards occur,
and how these factors might influence the manner in which hazardous space is
perceived and therefore, how individuals or communities respond to the risk
posed by hazards. That context matters greatly to hazard studies, however, is
increasingly recognized by researchers seeking to explain why the number of
people affected by disasters is increasing in spite of technological advances and
7

improved prediction capabilities (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cannon, 1994; Gregory et
al., 1997; Hewitt, 1983, 1997; and Maskrey, 1994).
Hazardous events take their greatest toll on human lives and create the
greatest human suffering in the less developed countries. More than half of all
natural disasters reported between 1991 and 2000 occurred in countries ranked
by the United National Development Program (UNDP) as being of medium
human development (MHD), while two-thirds of all deaths occurred in countries
of low human development (LHD) (IFRC, 2001 162). These are the nations
where hazard studies placing perception in context are most needed. The need
is especially great in the case of volcanic hazards because there have been
tremendous population increases in LHDs and MHDs over the past decades. In
many countries with active volcanoes more people are living in areas that could
be affected by the effects of eruptions. Due to the long return period of eruptions
these are also places where no recent eruptions have occurred (Simkin et al.,
2001).
The literature review examines four aspects of the overall body of hazards
literature: (1) individual perception of volcanic hazards; (2) response to
evacuation; (3) the role of the tourist industry in preparedness, response and
recovery; and (4) vulnerability and marginalization. It should be noted that there
is considerable cross-over and interconnectedness among the research areas.
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Individual Perception of Natural Hazards
Perception contributes to how humans understand the world. The “range
of judgments, beliefs and attitudes” (Taylor, Stewart and Downton, 1988) that is
formed in turn influences how individuals respond to hazards and hazard
warnings.
Volcanic hazards present special challenges to perception because
eruptions produce a variety of different hazards that have different spatial
dimensions and impacts. Additionally, explosive eruptions generally have long
return periods. The range of eruption hazards includes lava flows, pyroclastic
surges and flows, tephra, gases, lateral blasts, debris avalanches, debris flows
(also called lahars) and floods (FEMA, 1997). All of these hazards create diverse
geographic areas of risk, and different degrees of risk, and all have somewhat
different effects on those in danger. These factors can make hazard perception
complex. Shield volcanoes are characterized by non-explosive eruptions and
lava flows are regular but rarely fast-moving. The perceptions of people living
near this type of volcano, with constant but relatively predictable and non-violent
activity, will be very different from those living on the flanks of volcanoes subject
to sudden, explosive eruptions. In the case of the latter, long periods of
quiescence, from decades to centuries, many encourage dense settlements in
areas that are in fact extremely hazardous (Blong, 1984). When this type of
volcano does begin an eruptive phase, those living in the area may perceive risk
quite differently from the scientists studying the hazard (Crandell, Mullineaux and
Miller, 1979; Mileti et al., 1991; Perry and Lindell, 1990), and some people may
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even deny that there is any significant risk (Newhall and Punongbayan, 1996).
Furthermore, some volcanoes may initiate an eruptive period that is
characterized by non-catastrophic hazards. During this period, populations living
in the hazard zone may be lulled into a false sense of security and discount the
possibility of a major eruption. As people continue with their daily routines they
may come to ignore warnings issued by authorities (Simkin et al., 2001).
In addition to the characteristics of the hazard itself, a range of cognitive
and situational factors contribute to shaping individual perception (for a review
see Tobin and Montz, 1997). Systems of belief sometimes contribute to
acceptance of the hazard as an event ordained by a god or gods, impossible to
evade. Such beliefs may also affect willingness to take protective action (Blong,
1984; Dibben and Chester, 1999; Murton and Shimabukuro, 1974). Systems of
belief may also determine what protective action is taken (Chester, 1993;
Chester et al., 1985; Lindell and Perry, 1992). Some researchers have found
that gender and ethnicity may influence hazard perception but exactly how this
occurs, if it does, is still not understood. Researchers in the 1970s found that
various ethnic groups in Hawaii had different attitudes toward volcanic hazards
and females generally perceived the hazard to be more threatening than did
males (Hodge, Sharp and Marts, 1979). On the other hand, the role of
experience in perception is much better understood and is related to the recency,
frequency and intensity of the hazard (Tobin and Montz, 1997).
Lack of recent experience with volcanic eruptions results in unfamiliarity
with the consequences of the associated hazards and people may be reluctant to
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take protective action. Ongoing eruptions on the other hand, may make the
hazard salient and people become more aware of potential impacts (Cola, 1996;
Dibben and Chester, 1999; Hodge, Sharp and Marts, 1979; Perry and Lindell,
1990; Punongbayan et al., 1996). In the case of frequent but low-impact events,
experience may translate into a false sense of security creating a potentially
high-risk situation for the individual who bases future response on past
experience (Johnston et al., 1999; Warrick, 1979).

Response to Evacuation
An evacuation is the removal of oneself or others from harm’s way and
there is an extensive literature on the management and effects of evacuation as
a protective measure (for a review see Perry, 1985). There is an equally
voluminous body of work on behavior in response to evacuation warnings (for a
review see Drabek, 1986). The review in this thesis considers only limited
aspects of the behavioral foundation on which human response to evacuation
warnings and orders is based, and some of the applications of these studies to
the discipline of emergency management.
Behavioral Aspects
Some of the early models to explain how people respond to evacuations
used rational choice and utility theories as the basis for explanation (see review
by Tobin and Montz, 1997). Since complete information rarely, if ever, exists and
studies showed that individuals do not always act in what appears to be their own
best self-interest, much subsequent research used emergent norm theory to
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explain how individuals determine whether or not to respond to evacuation
warnings (Perry, 1979, 1985 and 1994; Perry, Lindell and Greene, 1982;
Quarantelli, 1980). Although there are variations in the basic model, emergent
norm theory suggests that under conditions of uncertainty, when presented with
a warning to evacuate, individuals first determine whether or not the threat is
real. If the threat is accepted as real, the next question is whether if affects the
individual and/or the individual’s family. Finally, a decision is made as to whether
evacuation, or a different protective measure, will reduce risk. Whether or not
the family is together or whether missing members are known to be in a safe
place are almost always factors in the decision-making process (Lindell and
Perry, 1992; Smith, 1996).
Each of the three steps in the decision-making process may be influenced
by a host of variables that circumscribe rational choice. Among other factors,
researchers have examined the roles played by age, gender and ethnicity; family
traits; hazard experience and perceived locus of control; a variety of community
and structural constraints; and prevailing health conditions (Tobin and Montz,
1997). Several of these variables are discussed in the above literature review of
perception. This approach has generated a bounded-rationality model to explain
behavior.
More recently, Gladwin et al., (2001) have used an ethnographic decision
tree model to determine evacuation decisions. These researchers argue that
decision-making is more complex than some models suggest and that an
ethnographic approach can capture “the richness of the decision process as well
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as its messiness” (Gladwin et al., 2001 118), and thus provide a sounder basis
for emergency management. This approach includes criteria such as safety
features of the home and discussions among family members as to the
appropriate course of action, factors overlooked in existing studies.
Many behavioral studies have focused on the reasons people do not
evacuate. Early research by Zeigler et al., (1981), as well as by Perry (1985),
showed that people frequently wait for an official order to evacuate before doing
so. This finding emphasizes the important role that the source issuing the
warning plays in ensuring the safety of populations at risk. Reluctance to
evacuate has also been attributed to fear that abandoned property will be looted.
Although some researchers conclude such fears are mostly unfounded (Fischer,
1994), looting is commonly thought to accompany most evacuations and this
perception is especially prevalent in the case of evacuations in response to
volcanic eruptions (Lindell and Perry, 1992).
Additional research has focused on what has come to be known as the
“crying wolf syndrome” (Breznitz, 1984). If there is no disaster after a warning
has been issued, people tend to ignore subsequent warnings, which can have
serious consequences. The management of evacuations in response to volcanic
hazards poses special challenges in this regard. Violent eruptions are
devastating but scientists are still not able to forecast exactly when, or even if,
they will occur (Chester, 1993). This makes it difficult for authorities to decide
when to issue an evacuation order or even whether it is advisable to do so.
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Emergency Management Aspects
In emergency management, evacuation is considered a generic protective
mechanism, one that can be applied to a variety of hazardous situations (FEMA,
n.d.). Depending on the characteristics of the hazard, evacuation may entail the
removal from harm’s way of only a few individuals, a limited evacuation, or the
mass movement of thousands of people. Mass evacuations are generally
disruptive (Rasid et al., 2000 1). In addition to the logistical considerations
involved in providing safe exit for those displaced, the livelihoods of people are
interrupted, and when an entire community is uprooted, its economic base may
be destroyed.
Some evacuations are spontaneous. People anticipate the impact of an
event, rising floodwaters, for example, and voluntarily move to an area they
consider safe. In other instances, people must be urged or required to leave an
area. The early studies by Zeigler et al. (1981) and Perry (1979, 1985) cited
above were confirmed recently by Fisher and his colleagues (1995). These
researchers studied evacuation response to a major toxic fire emergency that
occurred in Ephrata, Pennsylvania in 1990. The study showed that people at risk
were much more likely to leave if they were ordered to do so, even though the
fire was an obvious threat. However, while people ordered to evacuate an area
will generally do so, compliance is not always prompt (Quarantelli and Dynes,
1972).
Another factor in whether or how quickly people respond is the credibility
of the source issuing the evacuation order. The more credible the source the

14

more likely it is that people will comply (Janda et al., 1996; Lindell and Perry,
1992; Perry, 1985). Compliance with an evacuation order is also much more
likely if there is a safe place to go to (Drabek and Hoetmer, 1991), and
assistance to leave the threatened area can affect evacuation rates in areas
where few individuals or families have their own means of transportation.
Evacuation may be an appropriate solution to saving lives, depending on
the circumstances and nature of the hazard, either before an event or
subsequent to its occurrence (Lindell and Perry, 1991). To illustrate: hurricane
evacuations generally take place before the storm makes landfall, but in the case
of earthquakes, evacuations generally occur post-impact, and involve getting
people away from areas where buildings or other structures have been
weakened by the shock and might collapse. In the case of preventive
evacuations, the timing of the evacuation is critical because when a population
has been removed from a potentially hazardous area, especially in the case of
mass evacuations, the people who have been evacuated generally have lost
their ability to earn a living. This situation requires, among other actions, the
provision of shelter, food, medical assistance, teaching for school-aged children
and, frequently, the retaining of adults so they can survive economically in what
may be a very different economic environment (Blong, 1984). These services
may have to be provided for a long time (Blong, 1984).
Under certain circumstances, rather than reduced exposure by removing
those at risk, authorities may opt for sheltering-in-place. The degree of risk to
which people are exposed if sheltering-in-place is the option may be very high,
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but this risk may be accepted so as to avoid the social and economic disruption
of an evacuation (Lindell and Perry, 1992). Even in small-scale evacuations
authorities must provide sheltering for the affected population.
Most evacuations involve coordination by authorities in one or two
localities only; others require a regional response; very large scale emergencies,
such as some types of volcanic eruptions, may require concerted action among
states/provinces or nations (FEMA, n.d.).

Tourist Industry and Disasters
Many tourist destinations are located in hazardous locations and the
number of tourists visiting these areas in recent years has been increasing.
Consequently, the number of people in potentially hazardous places has also
been on the rise (Drabek, 1995). The role of the tourist industry in hazard
prevention, response and recovery, however, is still under-researched (Drabek,
1995; Faulkner, 2001).
Tourists may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of hazards because
they are generally in unfamiliar surroundings and they depend greatly on the
availability and smooth functioning of local services, such as hotels or motels,
restaurants, transportation – even hospitals. Lack of fluency in the local
language may make it difficult to understand hazard warnings or other
emergency communications or result in misunderstanding of these messages. It
would seem then, that the level of preparedness, ability and willingness of local
tourist establishments to assist travelers during periods of crisis is crucial to
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prevent or minimize injury or loss of life. This aspect of hazard emergency
management was studied in the United States by Drabek (1995, 1992) who
concluded that only larger companies had emergency plans and that “the overall
record is very spotty” (1995 7), even in communities with relatively recent hazard
experience.
The economies of smaller communities that attract tourists may also be
highly or exclusively dependent on a steady influx of people. When the flow is
interrupted, almost everyone in these communities can be adversely affected.
The tourist industry frequently minimized the hazardousness of a particular
location (Cammisa, 1993 in Faulkner, 2001; Murphy and Bayley, 1989). Efforts
to preserve the economy intact may partially explain such denial. Minimizing
perceived risk may also be a factor in the ability of a tourist destination to recover
after a disaster (Murphy and Bayley, 1989), although recovery may be protracted
and the site may never return to its former level of activity, as occurred with the
hot-spring resort of Toyako-Onsen, located at the foot of the volcano, Mt. Usu,
Japan, in the late 1970s (Hirose, 1982).

Vulnerability and Marginalization
Tobin and Montz (1997) have pointed out that so-called “rational” behavior
designed to reduce exposure to a potential hazard does not always follow from
individual or community perception of the event because a host of other factors,
both internal and external, intervene to modify the expected response. With
respect particularly to external factors, these two researchers write that “the
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individual may feel relatively powerless…when confronted with the realities of
major political, social, and economic structures that serve to constrain individual
activity” (Tobin and Montz, 1997 133).
Such constraints or limitations obviously make the individual more
vulnerable because appropriate behavioral choices that lead to preventing,
avoiding or recovering from the disaster may not be available options.
This particular aspect of disaster studies has been researched by a
number of investigators including Blaikie et al. (1994), Cannon (1994), Hewitt
(1983, 1997), and Wisner (2001). Hewitt (1997) argued that vulnerability
“depends, in large measure, upon ongoing conditions of material and social life,
or their transformation” (167). These “ongoing conditions” create circumstances
in which risk is not shared equally by all people or groups in society and where
the ability of some to recover when disaster does strike is greater because they
have access to more resources (Cannon, 1994). For disadvantaged or
marginalized groups, particularly, the effort required to survive day-to-day is allconsuming, and people may live in hazard-prone areas because it is, or appears
to be, their only viable option (Blaikie et al., 1994). The challenges that people
routinely face on a daily basis may not allow them to worry about whether the
river they live next to or the flanks of the volcano they live on are hazardous
places (Maskrey, 1994). Research in New Zealand, which included
consideration of cultural and social factors, confirmed earlier studies that, among
the less affluent, present problems outweighed consideration of possible future
disaster (Gregory et al., 1997).
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Vulnerability, however, does not affect only the poor. Affluent people may
also live in hazardous environments and may be very reluctant to abandon their
possessions when disaster threatens. They know that it could be difficult and
perhaps take years to reestablish themselves in other locations (Dibben and
Chester, 1999).
Individual vulnerability to disaster is only one aspect of risk analysis. On a
much larger scale, the effects of natural disasters seem to affect some countries
or regions more than others (Hewitt, 1997; Tobin and Montz, 1997). These
countries are generally countries of low- and medium-human-development (El
Masri and Tipple, 1997; IFRC, 2001) or, as Wisner (2001) points out, they are
nations with a “long history of political and economic marginalization” (2). In
these countries there is still ample room for research into the causes of human
vulnerability. To be successful, such studies must pay attention to what Maskrey
(1994) refers to as “local specificities” including “local historical and geographical
variations” (122).

Theoretical Framework
Two frameworks guided this research: individual decision-making was
examined according to emergent norm theory and a bounded rationality model;
vulnerability was examined in terms of a model showing the relationship between
a hazard and the social, political and economic context in which it occurs.
While emergent norm theory seeks to explain how individuals make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty by progressing through a three-stage
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decision-making process (Lindell and Perry, 1992; Perry, 1985; Smith, 1996;
Tobin and Montz, 1997), the bounded rationality model suggests that a host of
cognitive and structural variables affect the manner in which individuals progress
through this process (see review in Tobin and Montz, 1997).
As relates to vulnerability, Cannon (1994 21) identified three aspects that
are important: livelihood vulnerability, self-protection vulnerability, and social
protection vulnerability. All three types of vulnerability are defined by income
opportunities, livelihood type, entry qualifications, assets and savings, and health
status. Self-protection is additionally influenced by such environmental
conditions as building quality, hazard protection and location of home or work.
Social protection, besides all of the forgoing elements, includes such
considerations as building regulations and technical interventions.
The determinants of each type of vulnerability include class position,
gender, ethnicity, age, the action of the state, technical ability or availability, and
the characteristics of the hazard itself, along with the level of scientific knowledge
and technical practices, and the science and engineering used by the state and
dominant groups. Cannon (1994) built these types of vulnerability and
determinants into a model, elements of which were used to guide this research
(Figure 1). The model suggests that self-protection (willingness to take action,
such as compliance with an evacuation order) might be contingent upon other
aspects of vulnerability determined by the social, political and economic context
in which the individual must make a decision when confronted with a potential
hazard.
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Figure 1. Model showing the relationship between hazard vulnerability,
and its root causes, in the causation of disasters
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Research Hypotheses
The literature review and the theoretical frameworks suggested two areas
for investigation, therefore two hypotheses were advanced:
(1) It was hypothesized that the socio-economic context in which the
hazard occurred contributed to the vulnerability of people who were evacuated
because this context limited the economic options available to them. Research
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was therefore conducted to examine the contextual conditions of the people who
were evacuated from Baños, looking specifically at social, economic and political
factors.
(2) It was hypothesized that perception of the volcano hazard was
influenced by specific geographic, economic and historical characteristics of
Baños. Research was therefore conducted into the spatial characteristics of the
town and its development.

Research Questions
Several research questions develop from these hypotheses:
1. How did evacuees and people who returned to the hazard zone in Baños
rank the volcano hazard in relation to the economic, political or social
context in which the hazard occurred?
2. What were the economic conditions of life for people in Baños before,
during and after the evacuation?
3. What political events were occurring during and after the evacuation?
4. What was the spatial distribution of hazards from the volcano?
5. What other natural hazards occurred in Ecuador that may have provided a
comparison of relative risk?
6. What other local “historical and geographical specificities” (Maskrey, 1994
122), if any, may have influenced hazard perception?
7. Was the tourist industry a prominent actor during the return and recovery
phases? If it was, what was its role?
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

The methodology consisted of analysis conducted at the level of the
individual, and at the local and national levels. This was achieved through
personal interviews, a review of academic and other publications, and
compilation and analysis of data from several statistical databases. All data
were subsequently consolidated and synthesized and placed on a timeline to
show what economic conditions and political developments were occurring just
prior to, during and subsequent to the evacuation of Baños.

Level of Analysis
Analysis was conducted at three levels: individual, local and national. At
the level of the individual, perceptions of the hazard, response to the evacuation
of Baños and surrounding communities, and ranking of crises were analyzed.
Local level analysis consisted of reviewing the physical, economic and historical
geographies of the town of Baños and adjacent areas affected by the volcanic
hazard. National level analysis consisted of examination of the socio-economic
context in which the hazard, the evacuation and the return to Baños occurred.

23

First level of analysis: review of individual perceptions of the hazard, response to
the evacuation, reasons for returning to the hazard zone, and ranking of
crises experienced.
Data for this level of analysis were extracted from a study conducted by
Graham Tobin, Ph.D. and Linda Whiteford, Ph.D., MPH, in which the researcher
participated as an assistant. The study examined the role of women in postdisaster environments and consisted principally of the application of two
structured questionnaire surveys.
The surveys were applied on-site in Ecuador, in Spanish, in June 2000
and January 2001, to individuals who had different evacuation experiences:
people who had evacuated to a shelter in a metropolitan area; individuals who
had evacuated and were working in a resettlement center in a small agricultural
community; people who had been evacuated but had returned and were living in
the town of Baños before the evacuation order issued by the authorities was
lifted; and a control group consisting of individuals living outside the hazard zone
and who had not experienced the disruption of an evacuation. The June 2000
survey consisted of 54 questions and was applied to 131 individuals; the January
2001 survey consisted of 70 questions and was applied to 171 individuals. Both
closed and open-ended questions were included in the questionnaires.
The steps taken with this first level of analysis were:
Step 1: Both surveys were reviewed for questions that related to hazard
perception, evacuation experience, perceptions of government assistance,
identification of events or occurrences that respondents classified as
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crises in their lives and reasons for returning to Baños. Twenty-three
questions considered relevant to the research for this thesis were
abstracted from the 2000 questionnaire and 16 from the 2001
questionnaire. The questions, in English translation, are included as
Appendix I and Appendix II respectively.
Step 2: Frequency tables of descriptive statistics relating to the selected
questions were generated using the software package, Statistical Program
for the Social Sciences (SPSS). On questions where there were
insufficient data in one or more of the possible responses, and where
grouping was appropriate, data were aggregated. For example, the
responses “high risk” and “very high risk” were grouped as “high risk,” and
the responses “low risk” and “moderate risk” were grouped as “moderate
risk.” On open-ended questions which resulted in a multitude of different
responses, these were grouped into broad categories. For example,
“Loss of Bank Funds,” “Loss/Lack of money” and “[Currency] Devaluation”
were grouped as “Economic Problems.” The data were further analyzed
by selecting certain variables for cross-tabulation.
Step 3: From the data analysis several themes were identified that suggested
research topics that would help to understand aspects of the socioeconomic context of the hazard that respondents said were significant.
These themes included principally political upheaval/change, currency
devaluation, and the nation’s bank crisis, conversion from a national
currency to the dollar, inflation, unemployment and underemployment.
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Second level of analysis: review of the physical, economic and historical
geographies of the town of Baños and adjacent areas affected by the
volcanic hazard and of materials relating to the actual evacuation of
Baños, dispersal of the population and return to the town.
The steps taken within the second level of analysis were:
Step 1: A site description that included elements of the physical geography of the
area, including rivers, topography, climate and soils. The spatial and
temporal distribution of major natural hazards was generally described
with more detailed attention given to the volcanic hazards of Tungurahua
Volcano. The site description was developed from scholarly geographical
and historical texts, a study of topographic maps, and from field
observations made by the researcher during four trips to the hazard zone
(in June 2000, January 2001, March 2002 and May 2002). The main
sources for data on Tungurahua Volcano were Ecuador’s Geophysics
Institute (Instituto Geofísico) and the Global Volcanism Program of the
Smithsonian Institution. Description of damages from the current eruptive
cycle came from field observations made during trips to communities on
the flanks of the volcano and to the west of the volcano in the Provinces of
Tungurahua and Chimborazo, discussions with representatives of local
emergency management and humanitarian organizations, informal
interviews with local inhabitants and monitoring over a three-year period of
print media reporting of the hazard. Some of the principal physical
characteristics of Baños and surrounding areas and of the volcanic hazard
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were photographed to aid in understanding and illustrating hazard effects
and the threat posed to Baños by the spatial characteristics of its location.
Step 2: A survey of the historical geography of Baños to help in understanding
some of the principal socio-economic characteristics of the area today that
appeared, from field observations and preliminary readings, to influence
vulnerability. These present-day characteristics included the town’s
dependence on tourism for its economic survival, the position taken by
some members of the clergy in regards to the evacuation, and the town’s
historical ties with the Ecuadorian Amazon.
Step 3: A brief study of the current importance of tourism to the town of Baños
and, by extension, of the importance of Baños to national tourism. The
study was conducted using local and national statistics provided by the
national Ministry of Tourism in Quito, the Provincial Ministry of Tourism in
Ambato and by the local tourism authority in Baños as well as an interview
with its director, a review of the tourism development plans of the
municipality of Baños, newspaper reports, and informal interviews with
local artisans, tour and hotel/motel operators. Basic demographic
information on Baños and surrounding areas, culled from 1990, 1995 and
2001 census data were included in this study.
Step 4: Description of the evacuation of the town of Baños in October 1999,
dispersal of the population, and the reoccupation of the town in January
2000 while the evacuation order was still in effect, focusing particularly on
those aspects that might contribute to understanding individual perception
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of the hazard and response to the evacuation as identified in the Level 1
analysis of questionnaire survey data. Source materials for this
description included newspaper reports, TV news clips, video footage
taken by participants in the return, official documents relating to the
evacuation and to sheltering of the population, published reports by local
and international NGOs, fields notes taken by the researcher during
administration of the questionnaire surveys for the Tobin and Whiteford
(2001) study, and informal interviews with local residents and
representatives of local and national agencies involved in disaster
response during research visits in March and May 2002.
Third level of analysis: review of the national socio-economic context in which the
volcanic hazard, the evacuation and the return to Baños occurred.
The steps taken within the third level of analysis were:
Step 1: Collection, analysis and, where appropriate, graphing of statistical data
on each of the topics identified as significant by individuals (from Level 1
analysis). Data were obtained primarily from the websites of the Instituto
National de Estadística y Censos (Census Bureau), the Banco Central del
Ecuador (Central Bank of Ecuador), the Ministerio de Agricultura (Ministry
of Agriculture), the Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del
Ecuador (Integrated Social Indicators System of Ecuador) and the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Step 2: Identification and analysis of additional events occurring in the general
hazard area and in Ecuador at the time that might have contributed to
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perceptions of relative risk. The on-line versions of the national daily
newspapers were the main sources for these topics.
Step 3: Identification and listing of significant natural hazards that occurred in
other parts of Ecuador while Mount Tungurahua was erupting. The main
sources were the national newspapers and the website of the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. One or more of the
following were criteria for inclusion on the list:
•

one or more fatalities

•

20 or more people reported injured

•

significant damage to property or infrastructure

•

livelihoods endangered

Whenever possible newspaper reports were checked against other
sources or one newspaper’s report compared against another’s.
Verification of many of the reports was not possible.

Consolidation and Synthesis
The final step in the methodology consisted of combining level 2 (local)
and level 3 (national) data in a timeline to assist in understanding the concurrent
nature of the several crises to which the people of Baños and surrounding areas
were exposed from the time they were evacuated in October 1999 through
December 2001 when the town was well on the way to recovery. For
completeness, major political events and economic data starting in January 1999
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were included in the timeline, although these predate the evacuation by several
months.

Notes on the Sources
Two main challenges were encountered with source materials. First, the
available number of academic texts on Baños and surrounding areas was limited.
The history of Baños, for example, was culled primarily from one text, written by
an academic in 1954 and not published during his lifetime. The text is
unabashedly enthusiastic about the town and its inhabitants, and was published
by the Ministry of Culture for the Province of Tungurahua in 2001 – subsequent
to the evacuation of Baños.
The second challenge was that statistical data were not as accessible in
Ecuador as is generally the case in the United States. This may be due in part to
the fact that data are not always maintained or are not maintained in easily
retrievable formats. For example, details of crop production in Baños and
peripheral communities at the time of the evacuation were provided by an official
from hand-written notes. It could also be due to the belief that statistical data
might be used for political purpose. Most data from the 2001 census, for
example, were only available in mid-2002 as preliminary data. The data had
become a political issue and the Director of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística
y Censos (INEC), the Ecuadorian Census Bureau, resigned in early 2002
claiming that the national government was requiring that cost-of-living data be
manipulated for political purpose due to upcoming elections.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY SITE: PHYSICAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

Introduction
Tungurahua Volcano (5,023 meters) is located in the Eastern Cordillera of
the Ecuadorian Andes at 10 28’ S, 780 27’ W (Hall et al., 1999) on the border
between the provinces of Tungurahua and Chimborazo (Map 1).
The research concentrated on the town of Baños, in Tungurahua
Province. Baños is the largest community in the volcano’s high risk zone. In the
event of a major eruption, this town and peripheral communities could be subject
to pyroclastic flows and lahars. For these reasons, the area was evacuated in
October 1999. When the hazards resulting from the volcano’s ongoing eruptions
did not cause major damage in Baños many people soon returned to live there.
Baños is located at an altitude of 1,800 meters, so the climate is mild and
relatively humid, compared with the harsh conditions that characterize most of
the surrounding villages. Built at the northern base of Mount Tungurahua, Baños
is a popular tourist destination, due in part to thermal springs heated by the
volcano. The town has also benefited from its location in one of the few passes
in the Andes between highland Ecuador and the Amazon basin.
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Map 1. Ecuador: Provinces
Ecuador: Provinces
81o

79o

77o

N

COLOMBIA
Esmeraldas

Carchi
Imbabura

Galápagos

0o

Pichincha

0o

QUITO

z

Sucumbios

Not to scale

Manabí

Napo
Orellana

Cotopaxi

Tungurahua

Tungurahua Volcano

Ch
im
bo
r az
o

Bo
liv
ar

Guayas

PA
C

IF I

2o

CO

CE

AN

Los
Rios

Pastaza

2o

Morona Santiago

Cañar

PERU
Azuay

Legend
z

Capital
Provinces most affected by
Mt. Tungurahua eruptions

4o

hin
chip

e

El Oro

Z am

ora
C

Loja

Lane, 2002

50 km

0

50

100 Kilometers

Base map: Defensa Civil Ecuador, undated

PERU
81o

Scale (approximate)

4o

79o

77o

This chapter describes the physical geography of the area in the vicinity of
and immediately to the north and west of Mount Tungurahua. The eastern and
southeastern flanks of the volcano are sparsely populated and had experienced
few effects from the eruptions, so are not included in this site description. The
section on the area’s physical geography is followed by a section on the general
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physical and demographic characteristics of the town of Baños. This is followed
by an outline of the principal economic activities in the town and surrounding
rural communities. Finally, the historical importance of the location of Baños on a
route between highland Ecuador and the Amazon is described.

Physical Geography of the Hazard Zone
Rivers and Relief
Mount Tungurahua is drained by several rivers. The most important are
the Chambo and the Pastaza. The Pastaza River is formed by the confluence of
the Chambo and the Patate at a location known as Las Juntas (“The Juncture”).
This point, northwest of the volcano, is approximately 6 kilometers west of the
town of Baños, which is located at the volcano’s northern base on a narrow
terrace between the gorge cut by the Pastaza River and the steep, exposed
remnants of an earlier Tungurahua (Hall et al., 1999). The Pastaza flows toward
the east, bordering the volcano on the north before proceeding through a narrow
pass in the Eastern Cordillera to the Amazon (Illustration 1). In the study area,
peaks in the mountain range to the north of the Pastaza attain heights of
between 3,100 meters and 3,700 meters, forming an almost unbroken northern
wall to the valley.
The Chambo River flows roughly southeast to northwest, through the
valley bordering the lower western flanks of the volcano (Illustration 2). None of
the mountains on the west bank of the Chambo is as high as Mount Tungurahua,
but these mountains too form a virtually unbroken range with elevations from
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approximately 2,900 meters (Chingazo II) in the south, to 3,800 meters (Cerro
Mulmul), located near the confluence of the Chambo and the Patate rivers.
Illustration 1. Valley of the Pastaza River

Lane, 2002
Looking east along the valley of the Pastaza toward the
town of Baños (left of center).
Illustration 2. Valley of the Chambo River

Lane, 2002
Looking south along the valley of the Chambo, with the
lower flanks of Mount Tungurahua on the left.
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Both the Pastaza and the Chambo have been dammed by lava flows from
the volcano during geologic and historic times (Hall et al., 1999). The danger of
such natural dams is that lakes form behind the dam. When these fail, torrents of
water descend the river valleys destroying everything in their path. There are
historical accounts of at least one such event.
In addition to the regionally important rivers described above, Mount
Tungurahua is drained by many smaller streams. Of particular importance are
the rivers Puela (a tributary of the Chambo), Vazcún and Ulba (tributaries of the
Pastaza). Numerous quebradas (ravines) form a radial pattern outward from the
summit of the volcano (Map 2). Lahars and other volcanic hazards have
descended the three rivers and the many quebradas in prehistoric and historic
eruptions. The town of Baños is located between the valleys of the Vazcún and
Ulba rivers (Map 3).
The Rio Blanco, which joins the Chambo in the southern section of the
study area, does not drain the volcano directly, but is an important physical
feature because it has been associated with two non-volcanic natural disasters
that severely impacted people, infrastructure and agriculture in the area during
the study period.
Portions of the local relief are extreme. The flanks of Mount Tungurahua
have a grade of 300 to 350 (Hall et al., 1999) (Map 4), and some of the ravines
draining the volcano have slopes approaching 700 (Kirkby, 1981). Parts of the
valley of the Vazcún River have slopes nearing 600.
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Map 2. Communities, rivers and ravines on the flanks
of Tungurahua Volcano
Communities, rivers and ravines on the flanks of Tungurahua Volcano
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Based on Baños quadrangle (Sheet 3989 IV, Series J721) produced by the Instituto Geográfico Militar, Quito, 2000.

Topographic profile: Valley of Pastaza River

Map 4. Topographic profile: Valley of Pastaza River

Lane, 2002

The highlands to the west of the Chambo River, where there has been
significant ash fall, are characterized by broad, undulating plains. Despite the
altitude, many of these areas support intensive agriculture. This is typical of
parts of Quero Canton in Tungurahua Province (Illustration 3).
Illustration 3. High plains in Tungurahua Province

Lane, 2002
These farms, west of Mount Tungurahua, are directly
in the path of ash emissions from the volcano, which
is partly visible in the background.
Climate and Soils
Climate in the area varies greatly. Because the study area is located near
the Equator, temperature is determined by elevation more than by any other
factor. Additionally, there can be large variances between nighttime and daytime
temperatures. The period from April/May through July/August is considered
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winter. The prevailing winds blow from east to west and bring moisture-laden
clouds from the Amazon basin. A rain shadow effect is noticeable on many
slopes. In general, lower elevations are drier than higher ones (Kirby, 1981).
It may take thousands of years for soils that develop near volcanoes to
acquire enough organic matter so they have good capacity for water retention
(Huttel et al., 1999). The soils closest to Mount Tungurahua contain more ash
than those farther to the south along the valley of the Chambo River (Kirby,
1981). Where the grade is steep (between 250 and 700), which is the case of
much of the land on the flanks of Tungurahua, the upper, fertile layers of soil
have been eroded, exposing the underlying hardpan, known locally as cangaua
(CEPEIGE, 1997). This applies to many of the lands in the valley of the Pastaza
River, near the town of Baños, where the development of large-scale, intensive
agriculture has not been possible for the most part, and where existing
agricultural activities are further eroding the soil (CEPEIGE, 1997).

Baños
The town of Baños is the seat of the Canton of Baños, which occupies an
area of 1,056.0 km2 and is divided administratively into one urban and four rural
parishes: Baños (urban) and Lligua, Ulba, Rio Verde and Rio Negro (Map 5). In
1995, the urban area of Baños occupied one square kilometer and population
density in the downtown area was approximately 180 people per hectare
(Asociación de Municipalidades del Ecuador – Municipio Baños de Agua Santa,
1996).
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Map 5. Canton of Baños: Parishes
Canton of Baños: Parishes
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Baños, Lligua and Ulba were the parishes most directly affected by the
volcano and the evacuation, but the entire canton suffered economically as a
result of closure of the highway between Ambato and the Oriente which passes
through the town of Baños and neighboring communities.
The Pastaza River runs through the canton from west to east, and most of
the population is concentrated in the narrow valley formed by the river. Baños is
located at an altitude of 1,800 meters, on a narrow shelf between the gorge of
the Pastaza River (Illustration 4), and the valleys of the Vazcún River to the west
and the Ulba River to the east.
41

Illustration 4. Pastaza River gorge at Baños

Lane, 2002

The narrow suspension bridge was the only way to exit directly from downtown
Baños over the Pastaza River during the time research was conducted. A dirt
path, used for pedestrian and animal traffic, zigzagged down from the level of the
town to the bridge, a difference in elevation of about 100 meters. A new bridge
was planned for the same location but built higher up the canyon walls, nearly at
street level in Baños, to enable faster evacuation. In August 2002 construction
had not been completed.
The valleys of the Vazcún and Ulba rivers were conduits for lahars during
historical eruptions in 1773, 1886, 1916 and 1918, and a large pyroclastic flow
descended the valley of the Vazcún in 1918 (Instituto Geofísico, 2002).
Demographics
In 2001, 73 percent of the cantonal population of 16,136 was concentrated
in the parish of Baños. Eighty-eight percent of parish inhabitants were in the
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cantonal seat, the town of Baños (Figure 2). This population made Baños the
largest community in the high risk zone.
Figure 2. Distribution of population in Baños Canton
Distribution of population in Baños Canton
(2001 Census)
11%

Baños (town)

7%

Baños (periphery)

7%
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2%

Rio Negro
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Rio Verde
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Data obtained from INEC statistics, 2001 Census
According to Ecuadorian Red Cross data, approximately 17,000 people
were evacuated in October 1999 from the hazardous areas in and around Baños
(Ecuadorian Red Cross, 1999), somewhat more than the total cantonal
population registered in the 2001 Census. Local officials estimated in March
2002 that only 60 percent of evacuees had returned to the hazardous areas.
Since the 1990 census, the cantonal seat, Baños, and its urban periphery
have grown at the expense of the rural parishes, but the overall population of the
canton has changed by only 4.7 percent (Table 1).
Table 1. Population growth in the Canton of Baños
Census
year
1990
2001

Baños
10,991
11,828

Rio
Rio
Ulba
Total
Negro
Verde
431
1,047
1,040
1,907
15,416
311
1,086
1,056
1,855
16,136
Data obtained from INEC 1990 and 2001 Censuses

Lligua
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No data were available for the town exclusively but, given the skewed
distribution of population, data for the canton are taken as representative of the
town. Based on the 1990 Census, literacy rates were high: 19.4 percent of the
population had completed secondary school. This was higher than in any other
canton in Tungurahua Province with the exception of Ambato, which includes the
provincial capital and where literacy rates were 24.8 percent. The incidence of
illiteracy was second to lowest in the province: only 8.7 percent of the population
of Baños could not read or write, which compared with 12.6 percent in Ambato
Canton, and an overall average of 14.0 percent for the province. Baños also had
a high percentage of college-educated people (9.1 percent), exceeded only by
the percentage in Ambato (14.8 percent) (SIISE, n.d.).
The level of education may possibly be reflected in the poverty rates
which, based on 1995 data, showed a similar pattern of relative wellbeing:
Baños, at 63.0 percent, had the lowest rate of poverty of consumption in
Tungurahua Province, where the average rate was 74.1 percent (SIISE, n.d.).
Separate data indicated that the Canton of Baños also had the lowest
percentage of population with basic needs unmet (Guzmán, 2001).
Economic Bases of the Town of Baños and Peripheral Communities
The principal economic activity in Baños was tourism. Because of its
importance, this activity is described separately in Chapter 6. The most
important industrial feature of the canton was the hydroelectric dam across the
Pastaza at Agoyán, a few kilometers east of Baños. The facility generated
approximately 15 percent of Ecuador’s electricity (Kielmas, 1999) (Map 6).

44

r

1 9’ 848 S

o

45

N
0 km

Scale (approximate)
3 km

Pa

2808

Juive Chico

Lligua

Adapted from: Hall, M. et al, 2002. Mapa de los peligros
potenciales del Volcán Tungurahua. Quito: IG-EPN

Cusua

Juive Grande

Las Juntas

er
Riv
a
z
sta

2260

3223

BAÑOS

2381

Santa Ana

San
Vicente

2473

Ulba

Pondoa

3507

3471

Agoyan
Dam

3507

2779

La
Ciénega

To
Puyo

Lane, 2002

Spot elevation
in meters
Rural community

Legend

Tomas Haflants

Santa Rosa
de Runtún

1800

Main road
Secondary road
River/Stream

Pititig

La Palma
Illuchi Bajo

o

78 30'

Baños and neighboring communities

Vazcún R
.

To Ambato

r
ive
C
h
am
b
o
Ri
ve

Map 6. Baños and neighboring communities

Ulba
R.

R
te
a
t
Pa

The most important commercial agricultural activity was aviculture. In late
1999 local ranches had a population of more than 250,000 chickens, of which
200,000 were on farms in Agoyán, east of the town of Baños. Subsistence
farming, on minifundios of mostly between ¼ and ½ hectare, was important for
families in the communities of Cusúa, Juive Grande, Pondoa, Juive Chico, Pititig,
Lligua, Illuchi, Lligniay, El Recreo, San Vicente, Santa Ana, Ulba, Agoyán, Santa
Rosa de Runtún and Bellavista (Illustration 5). With the exception of Cusúa, all
of these communities are in the Canton of Baños. Cusúa is in Pelileo Canton but
because of its proximity to the town of Baños, for planning and evacuation
purposes, it was included with Baños by Civil Defense authorities. Small farms
in, and near these communities produced surplus that helped supply local
markets, principally in Baños. Corn was important locally, as were crops of
beans and tree tomatoes. At the higher elevations there were plantings of crops
such as onions and potatoes; at the lower elevations, farming activity included
small orchards of tropical or subtropical fruits. Much of the area in the parish of
Baños was in pasture. Farm families typically owned two or three cows and pigs,
in addition to a few chickens. Equines, mostly asses, were used primarily for
farm work and transportation (Ministerio de Agricultura, 1999).
No data on the actual populations of these rural communities were
available but Ministry of Agriculture data listed approximately 750 rural homes
scattered throughout the area. Rural families generally consisted of at least five
to six people so there were possibly between 3,700 and 4,500 people living on
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area small farms at the time of the evacuation in October 1999 (Ministerio de
Agricultura, 1999).
Illustration 5. Farm in Ulba River valley

Lane, 2002
Small farms, like the one in the foreground, are located
throughout the valley of the Ulba and in the valleys of other
rivers in the hazard area. Lahars descended the Ulba valley
in 1886, 1916 and 1918. In some areas the slopes angle as
much as 60 to 70 degrees.
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Gateway Between East and West
The town of Baños is located in one of less than a handful of passes in the
Ecuadorian Andes between the high intermontane central valley and the Amazon
basin. The town’s development has been closely associated with its
geographical location.
The narrow passageway created by the Pastaza River through the
Eastern Cordillera of the Andes was the conduit for successive movements of
people between the regions east and west of the mountain chain. Small bands
of pre-Colombian tribes may have moved up the Pastaza from the Amazon and
established temporary communities in the area where Baños was subsequently
founded (Reyes, 2001), although most authorities maintain that among these
peoples, the Puruhá entered the high inter-Andean valley from points north and
south of Tungurahua. Regardless, once established in the central Andean
region, the Puruhá kept in contact with the Amazon region by using the valley of
the Pastaza (Gomez, 1999), and shortly after the Spanish arrived in Ecuador in
the 1530s, this was the route these indigenous people used to withdraw to the
safety of the Amazon (Reyes, 2001).
The Spaniards came to the area in 1541 looking for silver mines that,
according to legend, were at the base of Tungurahua. The Spanish Crown
consolidated its sovereignty over the area by granting land and mining rights.
This firmly established the Spanish presence in the valley of the Pastaza and
along the Chambo and Patate rivers.
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It was left to the Dominicans though to establish a permanent settlement,
which they did in 1553, and which they named Pueblo del Espíritu Santo, later to
become Baños (“Baths” in English). From Baños the religious order extended
the Catholic religion and the domain of Spain into the Oriente, or Amazon. By
1583, the place that started as a simple shrine had become an important center
for pilgrims who may have come from as far away as Lima in Peru (Reyes,
2001).
By 1628, the path through Baños had become the main route between
Riobamba and the Amazon region. In the early 1600s the Jesuits, like the
Dominicans, were also advancing along the Pastaza, but in the opposite
direction, from east to west, having come up the Amazon and its tributary the
Bobonaza (Zúñiga, 1977). The Jesuits finally made it all the way through in 1655
and established themselves in the valley of the Patate (Reyes, 2001), to the
northwest of Baños. In 1743, an Ecuadorian scientist, Pedro Vicente
Maldonado, who was also a former governor of Esmeraldas Province and the
owner of property that extended from Cusúa near Baños all the way to Canelos
in the Amazon, followed the same route that the Jesuits had used but in the
opposite direction. He proceeded from west to east, in order to meet up with a
French scientific expedition (Zúñiga, 1977).
In the 1750s, the Spanish government realized that the valley of the
Pastaza was a more convenient and accessible means of reaching the Tierra de
la Canela (Land of Cinnamon) than the more northerly route taken earlier by
Gonzalo Pizarro and Francisco de Orellana in their search for the land of spices
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(Rudolph, 1991). From this time on, Baños became an important point for
exploration of the Amazon region and of Spanish efforts to halt the westward
advance of Portuguese and Brazilians (Reyes, 2001). After the independence
movements in Spanish-America in the early 1800s, Ecuadorian incursions into
the Amazon region came into direct conflict with Peruvian interests in the area.
Baños, because of its strategic location in the east-west pass, was the “jumping
off” point for many expeditions into the contested territory (Reyes, 2001).
The pass in the Eastern Cordillera carved by the Pastaza River continues
to be strategically important today. Among other efforts to further develop its
economic base, the town of Baños was positioning itself as the launching point
for ecotourism to the Amazon (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio
de Turismo, 2002), the fastest-growing segment of the tourist industry in
Ecuador.
Prior to the eruption and evacuation of Baños in 1999, the Ecuadorian
government signed an agreement with an Argentinian firm for a multimillion-dollar
highway construction project to improve the existing narrow, mostly unpaved
road between Baños and Puyo in the southern portion of Pastaza Province
where oil exploration activities are underway. Subsequently, two Ecuadorian
presidents, Alvaro Noboa and Lúcio Gutierrez, placed funding and completion of
the road on their agendas when meeting with their Argentinian counterparts (La
Hora, March 5, 2000; El Comercio, December 5, 2002), highlighting the
importance of this east-west route.
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Conclusions
The area around Mount Tungurahua is physically rugged, with highly
eroded soils in many areas, and unreliable sources of water for irrigation. Deep
valleys with fast-flowing rivers make communication difficult and sometimes
hazardous. For inhabitants of rural communities, even under normal
circumstances, life in this environment is harsh and economic survival
precarious. The town of Baños, on the other hand, with its amenable climate,
and non-agriculture-based economy, has become a center of relatively prosperity
and wellbeing.
The physical space that Baños occupies offers both advantages and
drawbacks. The thermal waters that are heated by the volcanic activity that
threatens the town with destruction have been successfully merchandized, first
by religious and later by secular entrepreneurs. The steeply-angled slopes and
outcroppings of ancient lava flows that make the area inappropriate for largescale agriculture provide the dramatic scenery that attracts visitors from Ecuador
and from throughout the world. The Pastaza River, with its deep gorge that
prevents fast exit from town in the event of a major eruption of Mount
Tungurahua, also made is possible for Baños to become a gateway between
east and west.
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CHAPTER 5
NATURAL HAZARDS

Introduction
In addition to the volcanic activity of Mount Tungurahua, other geologic
and meteorological hazards frequently afflict areas currently affected by the
volcano. Earthquakes are a major and widespread hazard and even relatively
small events can trigger massive landslides. Prolonged or heavy rainfall is often
followed by flash floods and slope failure due to the steepness of the terrain.
Droughts, windstorms and ice storms are not uncommon.
During historic times, earthquakes have claimed more lives in the
provinces of Chimborazo and Tungurahua, and caused greater damage to
property and infrastructure than have the infrequent eruptions of Mount
Tungurahua. Furthermore, given the current prevalence of landslides, it is likely
that these hazards also have taken a great toll on the people living in the area.
In order to understand perception and response to Tungurahua’s current
eruptions and associated hazards, it is helpful to consider them in relation to
concurrent hazards and to the historical records of natural hazards that are
known to have caused great numbers of fatalities as well as social and economic
disruption.
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The chapter compares the effects of the current volcano hazard in
Chimborazo Province and in other parts of Tungurahua Province with effects on
the town of Baños and its satellite communities; reviews the impacts of previous
historical eruptions on Baños; describes the effects of major area earthquakes;
and lists non-volcanic natural hazards that resulted in loss of life, damage to
property or infrastructure, or that in some fashion may have diverted local or
national resources from the volcanic emergency during the research period.

Tungurahua Volcano
Mount Tungurahua is one of a number of active volcanoes in the Eastern
Cordillera, one of two parallel ranges of the Andes that traverse Ecuador from
north to south. The volcano’s summit (5,023 meters) towers over the
surrounding countryside, where elevations are approximately in the 2,000- to
2,200-meter range (Illustration 6). Tungurahua is a relatively young
stratovolcano (Hall et al, 1999; GVP, 1999) that is actively building and helping to
shape the landscape around it. Locally it is also known as Mama Tungurahua.
The most extensive damage from the volcano’s current cycle has been
from ash fall which has repeatedly affected populations and agriculture in rural
areas. Two populous provincial capitals (Ambato and Riobamba) and several
medium-sized towns have also been affected but to lesser degrees. Lahars have
been frequent but affect a much more restricted area in the immediate vicinity of
the volcano.
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Illustration 6. Tungurahua Volcano

Lane, 2002

A column of steam and gasses rises from the symmetrical cone of Mount
Tungurahua on March 19, 2002. The volcano is often shrouded in clouds.
The volcano straddles the border between Tungurahua and Chimborazo
Provinces and the impacts of eruptions have been felt primarily in Baños, Pelileo,
Quero, Mocha and Tisaleo Cantons in Tungurahua Province (Map 7), and in
Guano and Penipe Cantons in Chimborazo Province (Map 8).
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Map 7. Cantons of Tungurahua Province
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Map 8. Cantons of Chimborazo Province
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Current Eruptive Cycle: 1999-?
Tungurahua has been monitored scientifically since 1989 (Instituto Geofísico,
n.d.). In September 1999 the volcano gave serious indications that it was
awakening from an 80-year sleep: seismic activity and gas emissions were on
the increase. On September 15, following continuous tremors and the emission
of a vapor column that extended to 2 kilometers above the crater, Civil Defense
authorities issued a yellow alert level on the volcano (GVP, 1999). This meant
that a major eruption was possible within weeks (see below for explanation of
alert levels). Three explosions on October 5, increasing gas emissions and
finally, incandescence at the crater on October 13, convinced authorities that an
explosive eruption was imminent, and the alert level was raised to orange on
October 16 (GVP, 1999). This action resulted in a mandatory evacuation order
for the town of Baños and for the smaller rural communities in similar high-risk
areas in the vicinity of the volcano. Inhabitants of some villages, particularly
those located at higher elevations, who had been experiencing ash fall regularly,
seen the incandescence, felt the tremors, or heard the loud rumblings and
roaring emanating from the volcano, had voluntarily started to leave the area
before the official order was issued.
Ecuador’s Civil Defense System recognizes four levels of alert: (1) WHITE
alerts authorities that they must start preparing or updating mitigation plans in
anticipation of the occurrence of an adverse event; (2) YELLOW, which may last
weeks or months, requires verification that personnel and means are available to
manage probable emergency situations and the execution of exercises and
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simulated evacuations; (3) ORANGE may last days or weeks. It requires
notification of the public that an emergency is possible and of any preparatory
measures that should be taken; as well as the mobilization of personnel and
equipment for a possible evacuation and intensification of community selfprotection measures; (4) RED is the actual occurrence of the hazard. Duration
may be hours or days. Emergency plans are implemented or executed (Defensa
Civil, 2001; researcher’s translation).
The major explosive eruption anticipated in mid-October 1999 had not
occurred as of December 2002, but Tungurahua had engaged in an almost
continuous display of activity, sometimes intense. This included at least one
pyroclastic flow that extended out 1,000 meters (GVP, 1999), the ejection of
incandescent material to heights sometimes several hundreds of meters above
the summit, numerous lahars, frequent ash fall, tremors and loud explosions, one
of which was heard 75 kilometers away in Quito, the capital of Ecuador (GVP,
2000).
Two Principal Current Hazards: Lahars and Ash Fall
Lahars
Starting in October 1999 numerous lahars or mudflows descended the
steep flanks of Tungurahua, following the natural route afforded by the
quebradas, and cutting across roads vital for communication and economic
activity (Table 2). The compilation in Table 2 is not complete as not all lahars
may be noted in available official records but does convey a sense of the
frequency of events.
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Table 2. Tungurahua Volcano: Lahars (October 1999 – July 2002)
Date
October 18-24

Location
1999
Chontapamba and Rea ravines

November 20

Baños area – 2 events

December 10

Mudflows – no details

January 21
January 29
February 5-6
October
November
February 19
March 16
April 29-30
May 3

2000
Several mudflows – no details
2 mudflows
Mudflows – no details
Frequent mudflows
Frequent mudflows
2001
Cusúa ravine
Vazcún, Los Pájaros, Las
Pampas
Las Pampas, Cusúa, Hacienda
and Achupashal sectors

June 11
July 18-24

Possible lahar recorded by
monitors
Cusúa, Basural, Mandur, Vazcún
and Ulba valleys
Achupashal ravine
Western flank

September 11-12
December 14-16
December 29

Path followed not given
Lahars
Juive Grande ravine

January 9
February 5 or 6
February 11-18

2002
Western flank
Path followed not given
Juive and Cusúa

February 19
April 7
April 21

Chontapamba sector
North flank
Path followed not given

April 28

3 lahars – Descended Juive and
Cusúa ravines
Path followed not given
Traveled northwest

May 9-15

May 1
June 3

Comments
Deposits on road between
Penipe and Baños
Both cut across highways; one
was 20 meters wide
Cut across three segments of
Baños-Penipe road

Roads affected

Generated by heavy rainfall
Lahars in Las Pampas area;
blocked Pelileo-Baños road on
April 29
Baños-Riobamba highway
blocked
July 19 lahars reached BañosRiobamba highway
Affected Penipe
Las Pampas and Los Pájaros
sectors affected

Affected Las Pampas
Pyroclastic flows traveled part
way down these ravines
Blocked Ambato-Baños road
Blocked Ambato- Baños road at
Las Pampas
Blocked Ambato- Baños road at
Las Pampas and Los Pájaros
Las Pampas

Compiled from GVP monthly and weekly reports for 1999 - 2002 and
newspaper reports over the same period.
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Besides being triggered by earthquakes, lahars also occur frequently
during the local rainy season. Most of the lahars have occurred on the
northwestern and western flanks, where ash has accumulated in larger quantities
(Illustration 7). These slopes remained on orange alert even after the alert level
for the Canton of Baños was downgraded to yellow on September 5, 2000
(Instituto Geofísico, n.d.).
Illustration 7. Destruction caused by lahars
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Lane, 2002

In May 2002 residents of the dangerous western and northwestern flanks
were using a primitive bypass road to access their farms. The main road,
bordering the valley of the Chambo River, was destroyed by lahars early in
the eruptive cycle. Two of the many ravines that drain the volcano are shown
here. They are near the flank community of Bilbao.
Many people returned to the dangerous areas and by May 2002 about 200
families were living on the volcano’s flanks in Tungurahua Province. In August
2001, emergency management personnel in Chimborazo Province estimated that
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there were 1,600 people living in communities on the flanks in the hazard zone
for which they were responsible (El Universo, August 31, 2001). Several months
later, one official estimated the number had increased to 2,000 (Rodriguez,
2002).
Lahars can travel quickly down steep slopes. Monitoring by the Instituto
Geofísico gives authorities some warning of when these events are occurring
and most people living on the flanks have learned to avoid the ravines where
lahars commonly occur. Some people, however, still do not stay away from
these hazardous places, particularly if there have been no recent events
(Rodriguez, 2002) (Illustration 8).
Ash Fall
Ash from Tungurahua is fine-grained (GVP, 2000) and is sometimes
carried great distances. Starting in 1999, ash fall became a common occurrence
in communities located approximately to the west and southwest of the volcano,
mainly in Riobamba, Penipe and Guano cantons in Chimborazo Province, and in
parts of Ambato, Baños, Pelileo, Quero, Mocha and Tisaleo cantons in
Tungurahua Province. Communities in other cantons and provinces were also
affected but to a much lesser extent. Even so, on February 14 and 15, 2000, for
example, ash was reported to the north-northwest of the volcano, in the towns of
Píllaro, Latacunga and Salcedo, with up to one millimeter deposited on that
occasion as far as 10 kilometers from Mount Tungurahua (GVP, 2000).
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Illustration 8. Ravine cut by lahar near Baños-Ambato road

Lane, 2002

The remains of a campfire and other signs of occupancy in this
ravine in March 2002 show that some people still had not
learned to avoid these areas at all times. Following the course
of ravines, fast-moving lahars can reach areas near the base
of the volcano like this one, right off the Baños-Ambato road,
in a few minutes.
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Besides showering down on the neighboring countryside, ash was
occasionally carried by prevailing, higher altitude winds hundreds of miles away,
towards the Ecuadorian coastline and out over the Pacific. Communities to the
north of the volcano, such as Baños, experienced ash fall only infrequently due to
the prevailing winds that generally push the ash plume toward the west and
southwest.
During the first weeks of intense activity in late 1999, up to one centimeter
of accumulated ash was reported to have fallen (GVP, 1999). Frequent
emissions continued throughout 2000, 2001 and 2002, with ash plumes or
steam-and-ash plumes becoming a familiar part of the local landscape. An
eruption in early February 2000 produced a high-altitude cloud consisting of a 12kilometer wide band of thick ash, a 27-kilometer wide band of finer ash and an
additional 26-kilometer band suspected to contain ash (Washington VAAC,
2000). On several occasions ash columns towered to 12 kilometers above sea
level and one reached to 13 kilometers (GVP, 2001). Throughout the eruptive
period several centimeters of ash would be deposited on the lower west flank of
the cone; farther west thicknesses would be millimeters deep. When ash deposit
thicknesses are mentioned in the reports of the Global Volcanism Program they
generally range from 0.5- to 2.0-millimeters.
In August 2001 there was a marked increase in activity. On August 5 a
strong eruption sent a massive ash column approximately 7.5 kilometers above
the crater (GVP, 2001). According to Instituto Geofísico estimates, this and
subsequent emissions through August 26, generated between 10 and 15 million
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metric tons of ash spread over parts of Chimborazo, Tungurahua and Bolívar
provinces (GVP, 2001) (Illustration 9).
Illustration 9. Ash fall in Chimborazo Province

© Diario El Universo. Reproduced with permission
A farmer in San José de Sabañag in Chimborazo
Province shakes ash from a fruit tree during
eruptions in August 2001. Recurrent ash fall has
caused serious problems for agriculture.
In some places depths of ash between 1.6 and 2.0 centimeters were
recorded (La Hora, August 19, 2001). An estimated 39,000 people (8,000
families) were affected. The ash blanketed 53,597 hectares of farmland and
pastures, destroying or endangering crops and livestock and damaging more
than 3,100 houses (OCHA, 2001). Because crop yields were so low, many small
farmers had to use the portion of the harvest normally reserved for seed as food
instead (WFP, 2001 – September 21).
Tungurahua engaged in another episode from September 12 through 25,
2001, depositing ash to the north in Pondoa, Runtún and Baños; to the
southwest in Quero, Penipe and Riobamba; and to the west in Pillate, Juive,
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Cotaló, and Bilbao, before settling into its usual pattern of small but regular
emissions (GVP, 2001).
Almost exactly one year to the day after the August/September 2001
eruptions, another cycle of intense emissions was underway: during the first
weeks of August 2002 a similar pattern of heavy ash fall occurred to the west and
southwest of the volcano, affecting 40 communities in Quero canton as well as
other portions of southern Tungurahua Province, parts of northern Chimborazo,
and portions of Bolívar Province (El Universo, August 15, 2002). Five thousand
acres of food crops and 10,000 acres of pastures were damaged (WFP, 2002 –
August 30). Farmers able to do so started evacuating their herds (El Universo,
August 19, 2002). The deepest ash fall recorded during that cycle was
measured at 2.5 centimeters. Agricultural production was forecast to decline by
five to ten percent (WFP 2002 – August 30).
Although the August 2001 and 2002 ash emission events were the most
spectacular, the volcano had been emitting ash clouds intermittently but
consistently since late 1999.
Hazard Experience in Baños During the Current Cycle
Although located in an area at high risk from pyroclastic flows, lahars and
potential flash flooding in the event a dam formed on the Pastaza River, by
December 2002, the town of Baños had escaped the worst of the direct impacts
of Mount Tungurahua’s current eruptive phase: ash fall and lahars. Since ash fall
had been directed generally to the west and southwest of the volcano by the
prevailing winds it was infrequent and light in Baños.
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Similarly, the town had

been spared the effects of most of the lahars which had descended primarily the
western and north-northwestern flanks, a few kilometers west of Baños, although
the course of one quebrada had brought a few large lahars to a point just to the
west of town. In November 1999, while Baños was evacuated, a lahar had
descended the valley of the Vazcún destroying part of one of the main tourist
attractions, El Salado thermal baths.
Lahar activity through 1999 and 2000 destroyed the road that winds along
the western flanks of the volcano in Chimborazo Province but the road along the
volcano’s northern flanks, leading from Ambato to Baños and on to the Oriente,
was quickly cleared and repaired following any lahar events. Consequently,
transportation to and from Baños was not disrupted except for brief periods of
time. Most of the time, Baños was also spared other direct reminders of the
hazard such as roaring and the continual sight of the eruption column which was
not visible from the center of town because of the intervening outcropping called
Runtún. The lack of visibility of the hazard was atypical as the column was
clearly visible from many other communities in the broader hazard zone
(Illustration 10).
Effects of Previous Historical Eruptions
The historical record indicates that during active cycles Tungurahua
alternates periods of quiet with periods of intense activity. The onset of the latter
is sudden (Mothes et al., 2001) leaving little or no time for warning and
evacuation. There are three eruptions of Mount Tungurahua for which there is
both historical and geologic evidence. These are the events of 1773, 1886, and
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1916-18. The historical record also reports activity from 1641 through 1646, but
the evidence is scant and scientists have yet to confirm these events (Hall et al.,
1999).
Illustration 10. Ash plume from Tungurahua seen from Riobamba

Lane, 2002
The ash plume from Tungurahua was clearly visible from
this location in Riobamba, Chimborazo Province, in
March 2002, and has become a common sight in many
communities. In Baños, at the foot of the volcano, the
plume is not usually seen and the town rarely receives
ash fall.
Geologic studies by Minard Hall and other scientists with the Instituto
Geofísico and members the French Institut de Recherche et Développement
(Hall et al., 1999), confirmed the following: during the 1773 event there was
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widespread tephra fall and the Pastaza River was blocked by a massive lava flow
that descended the volcano’s north-northwest flank; the 1886 eruption was
marked by “numerous pyroclastic flows that descended different routes on the
western flank” (Hall et al., 1999 14), and a lava flow created a dam across the
Chambo; the period from 1916 through 1918 was also characterized by
pyroclastic flows.
Lahars occurred frequently during all three of the historic eruptions.
Towns like Baños, on the north, and the villages of Puela and Penipe to the
southwest, as well as smaller communities along the western flanks were at
great risk. Heavy ash fall also occurred on occasion during all three historic
eruptions (Hall et al., 1999).
The historical record indicates that several people died in an April 1773
eruption when what was described at the time as a hot mudflow descended the
valley of the Vazcún and entered part of Baños (Reyes, 2001; Martínez, 1932).
Some of the residents of Baños were able to escape across the Pastaza River.
The 1773 eruption caused the dispersal of the town’s inhabitants to other
communities and it was several years before Baños fully recovered from the
1773 event (Reyes, 2001).
Two brothers, Augusto and Nicholás Martinez wrote eyewitness accounts
of the 1886 and 1916-18 eruptions. The following details were abstracted from
excerpts from their writings, published in 1904 and 1932 respectively, and
compiled recently by Manuel Espinosa Apolo (2000).

67

During the 1886 eruption Augusto Martínez noted pyroclastic flows that
descended ravines on the volcano. The first of these flowed down the northnorthwest flank in the area of Juive Grande and Juive Chico and dammed the
Pastaza for 15 days, forming a lake that inundated lands along the Patate River.
Huge lahars descended the courses of the Puela, Ulba and Vazcún Rivers. A
river of lava descended the northwest flank in the area where present-day Cusúa
is located. Ash fall was extensive, reaching thicknesses of 20 centimeters in
parts of the highlands of Chimborazo Province. In Ambato, ash fell for 18 hours.
Tungurahua’s last 1886 eruptive display was on November 16. The volcano
produced a pyroclastic flow and an eruption column heavily laden with tephra
that deposited ash as far north as Quito (Apolo, 2000).
The 1916-1918 eruptions reached a climax toward the end of 1918.
Nicolás Martínez, in a study published in 1932, reported seven great eruptions
between January and November 1918, all of them “extremely violent but shortlived” (Apolo, 2000 144; researcher’s translation). The worst eruption occurred
on April 5 without warning and it caused widespread destruction. The largest
pyroclastic flows “descended the valley of the Vadcún [sic.], at the entrance to
Baños, which was not at all surprising since many ravines that originate at the
crater feed this valley” (in Apolo, 2000 150; researcher’s translation). The flow
stopped 100 meters short of the town proper. Describing the devastation
wrought in the valley of the Ulba, Martínez noted that it was in many ways worse
even than that in the Vazcún,
because the pyroclastic flow…melted the ice fields that cover the
eastern summit of Tungurahua, melting them instantly…and
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generating a formidable lahar that covered or carried before it
houses, animals and plants, without, fortunately, causing one single
human victim. When this lahar arrived at the Pastaza, because of
its momentum it crossed [the river], dashing against the opposite
bank and causing a great landslide that formed a dam that
contained the waters of the river and formed a beautiful lake, more
than one kilometer long, which lasted for several months (in Apolo,
2000 152; researcher’s translation).

Other Significant Natural Hazards
Earthquakes: Historical Accounts
One of the earliest accounts of the vulnerability of humans to the area’s
natural hazards dates from 1640 when an entire indigenous village near
Riobamba in Chimborazo Province was destroyed (Wolf, 1904). Subsequent
earthquakes that caused significant death and destruction in Chimborazo and
Tungurahua provinces in the general vicinity of the study area, and which are
well-documented, occurred in 1645, 1698, 1797, 1840 and 1949 (Apolo, 2000).
Official reports to the Spanish Crown listed 6,500 dead in the 1698 event. The
1797 earthquake is considered to be the worst in Ecuador’s history (Egred,
2000). Riobamba, near the epicenter, was destroyed, prompting relocation of the
town – a fact that current residents almost invariably refer to when talking with
visitors. Estimates of the number of dead vary greatly. The official count was
13,533, but conservative historians calculate that approximately 20,000 perished
(Egred, 2000). In Baños 432 people died and the town’s development came to a
halt temporarily. The earthquake disrupted the terrain so greatly that a natural
dam was formed on the Patate River. After three months, the dam broke and a
huge wall of water descended the Pastaza, again causing destruction in Baños

69

(Reyes, 2001). Finally, an earthquake in 1949 completely destroyed the old
town of Pelileo, located between Ambato and Baños. The earthquake also razed
entire sections of Ambato, damaged 32 other communities in Tungurahua
Province, ten in Cotopaxi and several in Chimborazo. The initial death toll in the
Pelileo earthquake was estimated at 6,000 but the final number was probably
much higher (Eichler, 1952). Perhaps the worst effect of the 1949 earthquake on
Baños was that the town’s transportation lifeline to the west was cut off (Reyes,
2001).
Natural Hazards Concurrent with the Eruptions of Tungurahua
Since Mount Tungurahua started erupting in late 1999, other natural
hazard events in the study area took lives and damaged property, and several
major natural disasters occurred in Ecuador. The following lists are by no means
complete but they do give a sense of the prevalence of these events during the
study period.
Concurrent Local Hazards
May 2000: Ice storms caused crop damage.
October 2000: A summit bloc failure on El Altar, a nearby inactive volcano,
resulted in a flash food and the deaths of 13 people in Penipe and Guano
cantons in the vicinity of Mount Tungurahua. Several homes and
business structures were destroyed, and there was extensive loss of
livestock and crops (Defensa Civil, 2000; Hall et al., 2000).
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October/November 2000: A drought, followed by a series of freezes, caused the
loss of 15,000 acres of crops in Tungurahua Province (La Hora,
November 18, 2000).
June 2001: Exceptionally heavy rainfall caused several landslides along the road
between Baños and Puyo in the Amazon region. Two people died in Rio
Verde, just east of Baños (El Universo, June 15, 2001; GVP, 2001). The
same storm system resulted in flooding along the Chambo, Blanco and
other rivers and the road between Penipe and Riobamba was partially
destroyed (Jordan, 2001) In the vicinity of Baños people living along the
Pastaza, Vazcún and Ulba Rivers had to move to higher ground. In
Ambato, the heavy rains caused flooding of the Ambato River, at least one
bridge was destroyed and the city’s potable water supply was
compromised (La Hora, June 12 and 13, 2001; Jordan, 2001).
August 2001: In Ambato, Tungurahua Province, local flooding resulted in one
death.
August/November 2001: Drought throughout the Sierra. Toward the end of the
period the low level of water in the Pastaza River threatened to
compromise generating capacity at Agoyan Hydroelectric plant (El
Comercio, 13 and18 November, 2001).
Concurrent Hazards in Other Parts of Ecuador
Late 1999: At about the same time that Mount Tungurahua started erupting,
Guagua Pichincha, a volcano that overlooks Quito, the capital of Ecuador,
also renewed its activity. The greatest threat to Quito was from ash fall
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which, had it continued for any length of time, could have seriously
disrupted activities in the city of 1.2 million. Some small villages closer to
the volcano were evacuated (GVP, 1999).
April 2000: Heavy rains throughout Ecuador caused extensive flooding and
numerous landslides resulting in 14 fatalities.
May 2000: Ice storms affected agriculture in the Central Sierra while heavy rains
throughout Ecuador resulted in 34 deaths from flooding. Twelve people
were killed in landslides in Imbabura and Carchi provinces.
July 2000: Activity at Guagua Pichincha volcano increased again and Quito
received light ash fall.
September 2000: Earthquakes in Guayas Province and in Quito caused property
damage.
October 2000: An earthquake centered near Ibarra in Imbabura Province caused
one fatality, injured several people and caused widespread damage to
homes partly due to local construction practices.
January 2001: Two scientists died at Guagua Pichincha Volcano in Quito (El
Universo, January 17, 2001).
March 2001: Heavy rains in many areas caused widespread flooding. Thirtynine people died in Sucumbíos and Orellana provinces. A landslide in
Alausí, Chimborazo Province, killed three people; in the province of Azuay
eight villages were isolated by a series of landslides (El Universo, March
13, 2001; La Hora, March 13, 2001).
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June 2001: Torrential rains caused flooding and landslides resulting in 41
fatalities and the loss of 4,000 livestock. Most fatalities were on the
Papallacta – Baeza road, about 70 kilometers east of Quito (OCHA, 2001
– June 20), where 14 landslides occurred in one 47-kilometer stretch.
One of the landslides damaged the trans-Ecuadorian oil pipeline (La Hora,
June 12, 2001). The same weather system caused extensive flooding in
four provinces in the Amazon region, destroying crops and disrupting
transportation systems. International food assistance was necessary to
feed people in isolated communities (WFP, 2001 – November 14).
July 2001: A landslide on the road between Loja and Zamorra killed two people;
a third was missing and presumed dead.
August 2001: Record snowfall in parts of the northern Sierra left 200 travelers
stranded.
August-November 2001: The lowest precipitations recorded in the Sierra of
Ecuador in 20 years. Province of Cotopaxi, adjacent to Tungurahua
Province, was among those most affected by the drought.

Conclusions
As of December 2002, there was no record available that showed a fatality
as a direct result of hazards from Mount Tungurahua, although the long-term
effects of poor nutrition and compromised health remained to be known.
Widespread ash fall from the volcano had caused many hardships for thousands
of rural people dependent on agriculture for their survival. Lahars had disrupted
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communications along the western and northwestern flanks particularly, causing
further economic distress for isolated communities. For townspeople in Baños,
however, once they returned to the homes they were forced to evacuate, the
rhythm of life eventually resumed, with scant experience with or evidence of the
potentially devastating hazard right on their doorstep. The impacts of
Tungurahua’s activity were almost always somewhere else.
Historically too, past eruptions were beyond the memory of most
residents. More recent cataclysms, such as the 1949 earthquake that destroyed
the nearby town of Old Pelileo and razed half the provincial capital, were still
within the lifespan of many local people. The horrendous flash-flood disaster in
October 2000 that killed 13 people in Penipe and Guano cantons, virtually right
next door to Baños, was factual, an actual occurrence. The possibility of a major
explosive eruption of Tungurahua, on the other hand, remained an uncertainty,
even for the scientists monitoring the volcano.
The normal progression of the seasons of the year regularly brought with it
its own set of hazards: flooding and landslides were certain to occur. Friends
and neighbors died in these events, only one or two at a time perhaps, but they
were actual happenings. For those who read newspapers or watched television,
even events farther away, in other parts of Ecuador, may at times have seemed
more threatening: certainly 30 or 40 people buried in a landslide or drowned in
rising floodwaters might be reminders of the instability of local slopes or of the
swift flow of the Pastaza, but not of the potential hazards from an explosive
eruption of Mount Tungurahua.
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CHAPTER 6
BAÑOS AND TOURISM

Introduction
Tourism is vital to the economy of Baños and the growth of international
travel tourism has made Baños an important contributor to the economy of
Ecuador. Visitors have been coming to Baños for several centuries, first as
religious pilgrims and later as secular tourists. In recent years, the number of
foreign visitors has edged ahead of the number of Ecuadorians visiting the town.
The latter still converge on Baños in the thousands especially on religious
holidays and during school vacation time.
The usual influx of tourists came to a halt during the weeks following the
October 1999 evacuation, although adventure-seekers continued to be attracted
to the area by the eruptions of Mount Tungurahua. The tourist industry was
devastated by the evacuation and members of the industry were prominent in the
movement to return to the town. Business owners and the Municipality, working
closely together, embarked on an aggressive campaign to counteract the
negative publicity that resulted from the eruptions and the evacuation. By
January 2001 local businesses appeared to be on the road to recovery and by
May 2002, Baños seemed to have reestablished itself as a prime tourist center in
spite of its hazardous location.
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Tourism and the Ecuadorian Economy
Tourism provides hard currency for Ecuador and its role in the economy
has been growing in importance for several years. In 2000, despite the fact that
the country was experiencing economic and political turmoil, approximately 615
thousand foreign tourists visited there and contributed US$402 million to the
economy (Ministerio de Turismo, 2002). This made tourism, with 7 percent of the
total, the country’s third-ranked source of foreign revenue from the sale of goods
and services. Sales of petroleum contributed 41 percent, and the export of
bananas about 14 percent. According to available data, tourism was expected to
rank third again in importance in 2001. By mid-year tourist revenues were about
US$213 million and were projected to reach US$441 million by yearend.
Tourism provided direct jobs for approximately 53,000 people and the data
suggested that as many as 160,000 people depended directly or indirectly on
tourist-related activities (Ministerio de Turismo, 2002).

Tourism and the Economy of Baños
Baños is one of the most popular tourist destinations in Ecuador. During
2000, the town was under an official evacuation order for the first eight months of
the year. Even so, according to Ministry of Tourism data, Baños ranked as the
country’s fifth most popular destination, with 140,000 foreign visitors, or 23
percent of all foreign tourists to Ecuador. Only Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca and
Otavalo drew more visitors (Ministerio de Turismo, 2002). Quito is the capital;
Guayaquil is the largest city and most important commercial center; Otavalo is
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famous for its Indian market and handicrafts; and Cuenca is a provincial capital
with a long history in the arts. According to the Director of the Baños Municipal
Tourism Department (Rios, 2002), the rankings for 1999 were similar, with
117,070 tourists visiting Baños out of a total of 509,000, also 23 percent of all
foreign visitors to Ecuador.
The peak months for tourism in Baños are June, July and August. These
are the most popular months for visits by foreign tourists and they are also
summer vacation months in the Sierra. Religious holidays, such as Carnaval
(the period preceding Lent), Easter and All Saints, attract large crowds from
throughout Ecuador. On the weekends, Baños is visited by many people from
the surrounding countryside and from the neighboring provincial capitals of
Ambato and Riobamba.
According to a survey conducted in November 2001 by the town’s Tourism
Department, 56 percent of all tourists visiting Baños were foreigners. Among the
44 percent of visitors who were Ecuadorians, 18 percent visited the town for
religious reasons (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo,
2002).
Directly and indirectly, tourism contributes to approximately 95 percent of
the town’s economic base (Rios, 2002). Local economic activities that benefit
from tourism include transportation, lodging, food and beverage, entertainment,
ecotourism and handicrafts.
The economic importance of tourism was emphasized in the Municipality’s
2002 development plan in which the industry was identified as the dominant
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factor in the local economy. In Baños, “all objectives, policies, strategies and
actions of all programs; all intents, resources and actions of public and private
agencies” (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo, 2002 2;
researcher’s translation) were based on the economic importance of tourism.
During research visits in 2000, 2001 and 2002, the extent to which Baños
was geared to tourists was obvious. The streets in the center of town were lined
with stores and restaurants catering to tourists. There were numerous photo
supply stores, internet cafés and bars. Travel/tour operators advertised outdoor
activities including kayaking, horseback riding, mountain climbing and
sightseeing. Street vendors catered principally to the many local visitors who
flocked to town on special holidays. Much of the informal commerce was
concentrated in an area to the east of downtown, and on the streets in the vicinity
of the basilica (Illustration 11).
Illustration 11. Street in front of Basilica

Lane, 2002
Baños appeared to have regained much of its preevacuation tourist activity by March 2002.
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The economic reliance of many of the inhabitants of Baños on tourism can
be surmised from the fact that entire families were engaged in the tourist trade.
For example, a husband might operate a taxi while the wife managed a food or
trinket booth on the street (Illustration 12). After school, even the children
sometimes contributed their labor to the family effort by helping to prepare food
for the following day’s sales or by working on handicrafts.
Illustration 12. Street vendor in Baños

Lane, 2002
The livelihoods of some families were
entirely dependent on tourism.
The small mom-and-pop operations were not the only ones where most
family members depended on the tourist trade for family income. A similar
dependence was noted among more prosperous segments of the population,
such as hotel/motel owners. Some motel owners were also tour operators, and
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owned restaurants and other related businesses. No data were available on
exactly how concentrated ownership of major tourist businesses was but it is
likely that it was highly concentrated.
In addition to tourism locally and in the immediate environs, ecotourism to
the Oriente was becoming increasingly important economically. Baños had
something of an advantage because of its location on a road through one of the
few passes over the Andes.
The Tourist Cadastre
Until tourism was decentralized early in 2001, the national Ministry of
Tourism, operating through the Provincial Ministries, was responsible for
maintaining a “Quality Control Cadastre” of establishments catering to tourists.
The cadastre was the basis for regulation and taxation of registered
establishments by the central government. In an effort to estimate what the
economic effects of the evacuation and eruptive activity of Mount Tungurahua
had been on the tourist industry in Baños, this cadastre was reviewed for
available years (Table 3).
The cadastre data show that although Baños was under an official
evacuation order for ten months (October 1999 through the end of August 2000),
there were more tourist establishments in 2001 than there had been in 1998.
Additionally, between 1997 and May 2002 room offerings increased by 42
percent (from 923 to 1311) and beds by 57 percent (from 1808 to 2818)
(Figure 3).
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Table 3. Tourist establishments in Baños (1997-2002)
Type of

1997 a

1998 a

1999 b

2000 c

2001 d

2002e

2002f

Hotels

3

3

-

-

5

4

7

Hostels

6

6

-

-

17

17

45

28

29

-

-

29

30

24

-

-

-

-

Pensions

17

18

-

-

22

22

Refuges

-

-

-

-

1

1

Cabanas

1

1

-

-

Hostelries

1

2

-

-

3

3

4

Restaurants

36

40

-

-

46

45

110

Pizzerias

-

-

-

-

Cafeterias

9

8

-

-

Soda fountains

-

1

-

-

Bars

4

4

-

-

Discothèques

4

5

-

-

Travel agencies

16

18

-

-

establishment

Residential
Hostels
Accommodations

2
2

9
9
6
28

9

23

3

6

6

9

8

8

28

37

Notes:
(a) Data provided by the national Ministry of Tourism in Quito.
(b) No data for 1999 available from the local, provincial or national agencies
responsible for record-keeping.
(c) No data for 2000 available from any agency possibly due to the fact that
companies listed on the cadastre were exempted from taxation by special
ministerial decree.
(d) Data provided by the provincial Ministry of Tourism in Ambato.
(e) Data provided by the Municipality of Baños Tourism Department in May 2002.
(f) Data accessed on the Municipality of Baños public website in August 2002;
may reflect establishments that were not registered with the Ministry of Tourism
when this entity was responsible for the cadastre, or some other cause.
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Figure 3. Growth in accommodations
Growth in accommodations
(1997-2002)
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Source: Baños tourist cadastres 1997-2002.
The Municipal Tourism Department estimated that occupancy rates in
2002 were approximately 40 percent. This was considered an average
occupancy rate for Baños (Rios, 2002).
Room rates were very inexpensive for visitors with hard currency.
Because of the opportunities for outdoor activities, Baños attracted many
backpackers, mountain climbers and similar active sports enthusiasts. Modest
but clean rooms were available in 2002 at daily rates as low as US$4.00. A
comfortable private room, within a few blocks of the main tourist area, could be
had for US$6.00 or US$7.00. A private room in a more upscale hostal, or in one
of the larger hotels in town, might go for US$12.00 to US$20.00 – expensive by
Ecuadorian standards. At the high-end, the single-occupancy rate on a wellappointed room at a resort hotel was $56.00 in 2002. This was well beyond what
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most visitors were able to or wanted to spend. The more upscale hotels
appeared be having the most difficulty in recovering financially. No data were
available from owners or managers of these establishments but personal
observations in 2002 suggested that this was the case. Also no data were
available to compare the rate structure pre-evacuation with that in effect in 2002.
Such comparisons might be difficult to make because of currency fluctuations
and inflation, but are essential for any detailed assessment of the economic
repercussions of the evacuation and eruptions on the hotel/motel industry in
Baños.
Meal prices were similarly attractive, but not noticeably more so than in
comparable restaurants in Ambato, Riobamba or Quito. A light lunch in Baños,
with a non-alcoholic beverage might cost in the neighborhood of $2.00 to $3.00.
A dinner entrée, accompanied by a glass of wine, could run from about $7.00 up.
The Baños Tourism Department was new, established in May 2001.
Under the national government’s modernization program, tourism was one of the
first activities to be decentralized, and Baños was one of the first municipalities to
assume responsibility for this activity (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa –
Ministerio de Turismo, 2002). Decentralization was the reason cadastres for the
various years could only be obtained from three separate entities: the
Municipality of Baños, the Provincial Ministry of Tourism for Tungurahua, and the
Ministry of Tourism in Quito.
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Continuing Investment in Tourism
In 2002, the Baños Municipality planned to invest $150,000 in
infrastructure enhancements of tourist facilities and services (Rios, 2002).
Improvements to basic public services for the community-at-large, such as the
provision of safe drinking water, appropriate management of solid waste disposal
and sewage treatment – which was non-existent at the time since all effluents
were dumped directly into the Pastaza River – were listed in the Municipality’s
planning document with references to the benefits such improvements would
have on the growth of tourism (Asociación de Municipalidades del Ecuador –
Municipio Baños de Agua Santa, 1996).
The Municipality of Baños had a direct financial interest in the tourist
industry, receiving revenues from the operation of several thermal baths. The
municipality planned to expand its revenues from the thermal baths by branching
out into specialty spas and increasing “health tourism” (Municipalidad Baños de
Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo, 2002).

Origins of Tourism to Baños
Religious Tourism
In 1553, Dominican missionaries established a small shrine in honor of the
Virgin Mary near one of the thermal springs emanating near the base of Mount
Tungurahua. Word of the miracles performed by the Virgin of Baños de Agua
Santa (Our Lady of the Holy Water Baths) and of the healing powers of her
thermal waters quickly spread throughout Ecuador (Reyes, 2001). Ever since,
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Baños has been a site for religious pilgrimages and there is a body of myths
about the Virgin that many people still believe and which appeared to have had
some influence on response to the hazard and the evacuation (See Appendix III
for highlights of four of the myths).
The Dominican order was still prominent in Baños and played an
important role during the evacuation of the town and the return of its people in
2000. In Baños the month of October is dedicated to celebrations honoring the
Virgen del Rosario de Agua Santa (Reyes, 2001) and since the evacuation
thousands of people have participated in religious processions (Illustration 13).
Illustration 13. Religious procession commemorating evacuation

© Diario La Hora, Ambato
Reproduced with permission
Thousands of people participated in a religious
procession in October 2001, commemorating the
second anniversary of the evacuation of Baños.
Many devotees were from communities in the rural areas around Baños.
Since the evacuation of the town in October 1999 and its reoccupation starting in
January 2000, the number of pilgrims making the trip to the basilica in the center
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of town increased tremendously (Guevara, 2002). The church was said by some
to be “the big winner” as a result of the evacuation. While the evacuation order
was in effect and prior to the mass movement to return in January 2000, the
resident Dominican priests were urging people to come to Baños for Sunday
mass in the Basilica (Mothes, 2000). On the first anniversary of the evacuation,
in October 2000, 15,000 people participated in a 5-hour procession from Los
Pájaros to the main sports stadium in downtown Baños to attend an open-air
mass (La Hora, October 22, 2000). Members of the clergy claimed that the
Virgin protected Baños from the volcano and from corrupt politicians (La Hora,
October 22, 2000).
In 2001, when local leaders successfully lobbied the central government
for the emission of a new set of postage stamps for the purpose of promoting
tourism to Baños, two of the five commemoratives were religious in nature, one
honoring the Virgen del Rosario de Agua Santa, described in the article as the
“eternal guardian of the town and its inhabitants,” the other depicting the basilica
in which the statue of the Virgin is housed. Tungurahua volcano and two local
waterfalls were depicted on the other three stamps. The newspaper report
described the volcano as “currently erupting and providing tourists with a unique
opportunity to admire this spectacle of nature, filled with magic and color” (La
Hora, July 26, 2001).
Secular Tourism
Organized secular tourism dated at least from the early part of the 20th
century. In the late 1920s, not too many years after Mount Tungurahua
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concluded its 1916-18 cycle of eruptions, the central government provided for the
construction of thermal baths, a road capable of carrying vehicular traffic, and
several reinforced concrete bridges. The improvement in access and facilities
must have had the desired effect of increasing the influx of tourists because by
1937 Baños had an electric power plant (Reyes, 2001) which was likely a luxury
for rural Ecuador at the time. By the 1950s, the population of the canton had
grown to 9,921 (CEPEIGE, 1997) and the town of Baños itself had about 3,000
inhabitants. Even in those days, the town’s population increased two- or
threefold on holidays (Reyes, 2001).

Tourism and Disaster Management
In a 2002 planning document, the Municipality of Baños recognized that
the attitude of the residents of Baños was to minimize risk: “There is no culture of
disaster management, and the local population, upon returning from the
evacuation, has minimized the problem. The slogan of Baneños is that ‘nothing
is happening’ and therefore few protective measures are taken” (Municipalidad
de Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo, 2002 10). The municipality’s
plan proposed, among several initiatives, that construction in high risk areas be
prohibited and called upon religious and educational leaders to support
emergency preparedness training.
During research visits to Baños in June 2000, January 2001, and March
and May 2002, it seemed there was no concerted, proactive effort to ensure that
hazard information was readily available to tourists. Instructions on what to do in
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the event of a major eruption were not prominently displayed. Only a few
establishments had posted the evacuation plan developed by Civil Defense. In
March 2002, a small sign posted in one of the main squares was smashed and
the wording unreadable, and appeared to have been that way for some time.
The sign was still broken in May 2002. Signs in other parts of town were also
defaced (Illustration 14). The bus terminal was not checked for hazard notices
on the first research trip, but on the three subsequent visits, no hazard notices or
evacuation plans were posted. The terminal is probably one of the most
important locations to alert and educate less affluent visitors to Baños. Broad
yellow stripes, painted on the surface of certain streets, which were designed to
direct inhabitants to less hazardous areas, mainly at the base of the Runtún
outcropping, were confusing to an outsider unfamiliar with any evacuation
procedures. At first inspection the stripes simply appeared to be directional
traffic signs (Illustration 15). Fortunately, this situation may have changed
because in a 2002 document, the Municipality itself recognized that the lack of
differentiation between regular traffic signs and evacuation signage was a
serious problem (Municipio de Baños de Agua Santa – Ministerio de Turismo,
2002). The same document expressed the intention of authorities to improve
emergency preparedness, including providing tourists with adequate evacuation
information.
An evacuation exercise in August 2002 was an indication that emergency
preparedness was on the municipality’s agenda. Based on subsequent press
reports it appeared that other risk-reduction activities were underway. In the
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case of the August 2002 exercise, however, apparently only about 30 percent of
the population participated. Municipal facilities, including the thermal baths, were
closed but most private businesses stayed open after the warning sirens were
activated. One official estimated that it took people far too long to reach
designated shelter areas. Had the emergency been real, many might have
perished (La Hora, August 3, 2002).
Illustration 14. Hazard sign in Baños

Lane, 2002

In March 2002, this sign indicating an area for
temporary shelter had been defaced, as were
several other emergency signs in town.
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Illustration 15. Evacuation route marking

Lane, 2002
The yellow arrow indicates an evacuation route. In some places these
arrows are easily confused with traffic signs. The building in the
background is one of the many smaller residential hotels or pensions in
Baños. Note the mural of Tungurahua Volcano on one wall.

Conclusions
The development of Baños has been associated historically with tourism:
first religious and later secular. During the past several decades, as agricultural
activity became less significant and rural areas lost population to the cities,
Baños came to depend more on tourism, to the degree that when Tungurahua
became active in 1999, this activity accounted for 95 percent of the town’s
economy.
Reliance on a single economic activity left local authorities and business
owners with no practical, short-term solution for recovery, other than an

90

aggressive campaign to get tourists back to the town. Considering the economic
crisis in Ecuador, it may have been fortunate that the economy of Baños
depended on tourism rather than some other activity, because of the high
percentage of foreign tourists from hard-currency countries.
By mid-2002, it appeared that town leaders had accomplished their goal of
getting tourists back. Measuring the degree to which this had been achieved is
difficult. The accuracy of the data from the Ministry of Tourism (2002), which
estimates 140,000 foreign visitors to Baños during 2000, is questionable. From
personal observation, there were very few foreign tourists in Baños in June of
2000 and it is highly unlikely that there were any great numbers prior to that since
this would correspond to the first months following the “retaking” of the town.
The data in the Municipality of Baños’ tourism cadastre show a dramatic increase
in the number of business in several categories of tourist establishment. The
increase requires further investigation and explanation. Although several
explanations suggest themselves, no verifiable explanation of the growth was
available for this research.
The best evidence of the success of the effort to bring tourists back to the
town comes from comparing conditions during the research visits in June 2000
and May 2002. On the first visit the streets downtown were almost empty; many
restaurants were open but few patrons were in evidence. In May 2002, the
streets were filled with moving, ebullient crowds, and at some restaurants all
tables were filled at the height of the lunch or dinner hour.
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The dark side of the economic recovery of Baños was that Mount
Tungurahua continued to present a significant threat to residents and visitors.
For local inhabitants, risk denial may have made living in a hazardous
environment possible but it may also have compromised their ability to respond
effectively to an eventual, explosive eruption. For out-of-town visitors, so long
as Tungurahua is a probable risk, lack of access to information about how to
respond in the event of an emergency could have catastrophic consequences.
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CHAPTER 7
RETURN AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Introduction
Volcanic eruptions are difficult for scientists to forecast with certainty and
therefore organizations responsible for public safety are presented with special
challenges when timing evacuations. In the case of volcanoes with a history of
explosive eruptions, given the characteristics of a particular location, or the
degree to which the community has anticipated an event and prepared for it,
sheltering-in-place may not be a viable option. On the other hand, if people are
forced to leave their homes, there must be some way of providing them with
adequate food and shelter. If the high level of risk persists, then the people who
have been displaced need assistance with training and jobs.
In the case of Tungurahua Volcano, thousands of people were displaced
from at-risk communities for weeks and in some cases for months. Most people
stayed nearby, in the provincial capitals of Ambato or Riobamba. Others traveled
to distant cities, like Guayaquil or even Quito. For many reasons, government
programs were unable to care for all of the people who needed assistance, and
because the country’s economy was in a shambles, it was very difficult for
evacuees to find jobs or reestablish their businesses. Owners of motels,
restaurants and similar businesses that were virtually tied to a particular location
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could not easily or quickly reestablish themselves somewhere else unless they
had the financial resources to do so. The mandatory evacuation implied that an
eruption was imminent, something that would happen within days. When it did
not, many people returned to Baños and other hazardous areas where they
believed, rightly or wrongly, that they had a better chance of economic survival
than if they continued to live as exiles.

Exodus: The Evacuation
When activity at Tungurahua increased rapidly in late 1999, authorities
started planning for a possible emergency. In the town of Baños preparedness
activities started in late August. On September 8, the day the volcano was
placed on alert by scientists, Civil Defense authorities started a public awareness
campaign, which included showing a video of the effects of volcanic eruptions. A
week later, when the alert level was raised to yellow, official emergency
management response was activated. On September 28, an evacuation
exercise was held in Baños. On October 5, Mount Tungurahua erupted.
Although the October 5 event was a small one, authorities were faced with
the possibility that, similar to prior historical events, a sudden and unpredictable
major eruption might follow. Given the virtual impossibility of getting people in
Baños to safety in time if such an event were to occur, authorities raised the alert
level to orange, triggering a mandatory evacuation of the town and neighboring
communities in the hazardous zones. Residents had approximately 48 hours in
which to prepare and leave their homes by the deadline of 6:00 pm on October
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16. The vast majority of people needed transportation to leave the area and this
was provided principally by local bus companies and military trucks. There were
no arrangements for the evacuation of farm or domestic animals and many
farmers either abandoned their animals or sold them to speculators at cut-rate
prices.
Some wealthier residents of Baños, and others with moveable assets or a
place to go, had already started leaving the town well in advance of the
mandatory evacuation. Residents in some of the rural communities located
higher up the flanks of the volcano had also started to evacuate voluntarily. The
vast majority, however, did not leave until required to do so. During the final
hours before the deadline, this reluctance was probably not helped by the refusal
of three Dominican priests to leave Baños. The priests claimed that according to
their calculations it was impossible for the volcano to damage the town and they
demanded that the authorities provide a notary to make a complete inventory of
the contents of the basilica’s museum (interview with Father Julio Estileno
broadcast on Chile TV, 1999).
Data from a study by Tobin and Whiteford (2001) supported the idea that it
took a mandatory evacuation order for most people to leave. Among former
Baños residents living in a shelter in Ambato, 57.6 percent listed the evacuation
order as the reason for deciding to leave their hometown, compared with only
30.0 percent who listed fear of the volcano as their reason. The mandated
departure was also the primary reason listed by 81.8 percent of residents who
had returned to Baños while the evacuation order was still in effect (Table 4).

95

Table 4. Reasons for leaving Baños
Reason for
Colégio Bolivar
Returned Baños
leaving Baños
shelter (n=33)
residents (n=11)
Fear of volcano hazard
30.0%
18.2%
Saw volcano erupting
3.1%
Safety of children
3.1%
Government/military
57.6%
81.8%
intervention – Warning
For a better life
3.1%
Everyone else leaving
3.1%
Total:
100.0%
100.0
Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.
The same study suggested that the evacuation order provided the impetus
that people needed to make them leave (Table 5). Approximately 60 percent of
respondents in both groups said they had left voluntarily but for at least half of
the respondents, “voluntary” meant in response to the military intervention.
Table 5. Did you leave voluntarily?
Interview
area
Living in
shelter in
Ambato
(n=36)
Returned to
live in Baños
(n=30)

Yes

Did you leave voluntarily?
Yes –
No –
evacuation evacuation
order
order

No

Total

30.6 %

30.6%

36.0%

2.8%

100%

23.3%

40.0%

23.3%

13.4%

100%

Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.

Diaspora: Destinations of Evacuees
Approximately 17,000 people were evacuated from Baños and its
peripheral communities; another 2,000 left the communities of Pillate, San Juan,
Mucubi and Cusúa in neighboring Pelileo Canton, also in Tungurahua Province.
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An additional 4,000 people were evacuated from communities on the western
flanks of the volcano, in Chimborazo Province (Ecuadorian Red Cross, 1999). It
was impossible to determine exactly where most people went, but Red Cross,
Civil Defense, and other officials estimated that the principal destinations for the
approximately 23,000 evacuees were Ambato, the provincial capital of
Tungurahua; Riobamba, the capital of Chimborazo Province; and Puyo, in
Pastaza Province in the Amazon region (Map 9). It is known that approximately
4,000 people sought asylum in the shelters set up in these three towns (Aráuz,
2000). Of the 19,000 people displaced from Tungurahua Province fewer than
2,000 proceeded to the numerous temporary shelters set up by the authorities,
considerably less than the 5,000 anticipated in the province’s emergency plan
(Herdoiza, 2000).
The temporary shelters were scattered throughout the cantons of Pelileo,
Patate and Ambato, in communities near the volcano but beyond the high risk
zone. Local school buildings were used for this purpose so classes at these
establishments had to be suspended. More than two weeks into the emergency,
on November 1, 1999, the national government authorized the establishment of
several resettlement centers, called Centros de Reactivación Poblacional
(CEREPS). Four of these were set up in Tungurahua Province: two in Ambato
and one each in the cantonal capitals of Patate and Pelileo. Religious
organizations also provided shelter at various locations for some of the
evacuees.
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Map 9. Principal urban destinations of 1999 evacuees
Principal urban destinations of 1999 evacuees
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One of the larger resettlement centers in Ambato was at Colégio Bolivar,
which housed people mainly from the poorer suburbs and peripheral
communities of Baños: La Ciénega, San Vicente, Ulba, Santa Ana, Lligua, Juive
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Chico and La Matriz (Herdoiza, 2000). Data on the number of residents housed
here initially were not available but in June 2000, when residents were
interviewed for the Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study, there were 208 people in
residence. In mid-September 2000, when all resettlement centers were officially
closed, there were still 180 evacuees living at Colégio Bolivar, about 86 percent
of the June 2000 shelter population.
Although the shelter population originated mostly from the poorer suburbs,
many of the people displaced from the town of Baños and its environs were
relatively prosperous small business people. Twenty-nine percent of the people
from Baños were middle-class small business owners, another 29 percent were
owners of tourist businesses (Figure 4). The socio-economic composition of
evacuees from the town of Baños was different from that of other displaced
groups. The 4,000 people displaced from Chimborazo Province and the 2,000
who left the rural communities in Tungurahua Province west of Baños were all
poor agriculturalists (Ecuadorian Red Cross, 1999).
Figure 4. Occupation of Baños evacuees
Occupation of Baños evacuees
Tourist
business
owners
29%

Urban poor
24%

Middle class:
small
business
owners
29%

Middle class:
underemployed
18%

Data obtained from Ecuadorian Red Cross, 1999.
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Conditions for Evacuees
The long-term shelters (resettlement centers) set up in Ambato in
Tungurahua Province housed mostly evacuees from Baños. The shelters were
crowded and people had little privacy. One building used as a shelter had a
leaky roof. However, for some residents the biggest problem may have been
that these places just were not home and, furthermore, there were few economic
opportunities available to them in the communities to which they had evacuated.
Eventually, government and NGO assistance to the shelters stopped.
Less is known about conditions for the thousands of displaced people who
flooded into Ambato and other communities without going to shelters. Based on
data obtained in formal and informal interviews, while some people went to live
with relatives or friends, these arrangements often did not last very long; some
people rented a room or a small house for as long as their savings held out;
some became impoverished. Newspaper reports dating from late 1999 and early
2000 indicate that conditions for these people were extremely difficult. Ambato
did not have the resources to accommodate such a large influx of displaced
people. The strain on public utilities, including water and trash collection, was
too much for the city to manage. Initially, individual residents and private
companies helped the evacuees but, as time went by, this assistance diminished
too. Neither the city, nor the province, nor the central government, had the
money to care for a protracted length of time for so many people.
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Return
Several weeks went by after the evacuation and the anticipated violent
eruption still did not happen. Anger and resentment at the authorities for their
unwillingness or inability to deal effectively with the evacuee problem became
organized around a movement to return to Baños. In the print media, the return
movement highlighted especially the plight of evacuees in shelters and the
hardships experienced by farmers in the vicinity of Baños. Both groups
represented a very small percentage of the displaced population. The largest
group affected economically were people engaged in tourist and related
industries which accounted for 95 percent of the town’s economic base.
The return movement was led principally by an organization called
Hermandad Baneña, composed of elements from the tourist industry, including
hotel owners/operators, tour guides, artisans’ associations and transportation
unions. Additional pressure on the authorities to allow the return of evacuees
came from the Province of Pastaza, immediately to the east of Baños Canton.
Closing the Ambato-Baños-Puyo road cut the economic lifeline to the southern
part of the province. The road was the principal means of accessing or leaving
the area. Further support for the movement almost certainly came from some of
the Dominican fathers who had stayed in Baños and who, by early November,
while the evacuation order was still in effect, were calling on their parishioners to
attend Sunday masses in the basilica (Mothes, 2000).
The mayor who held office when Baños was evacuated maintained that
townspeople should not return until the alert level was downgraded, but by the
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end of December, Hermandad Baneña had become sufficiently well-organized
politically to be able to mobilize a return. This they announced on January 4 in a
televised meeting with the Governor of Tungurahua Province. In the meeting
Hermandad Baneña demanded: (1) the reopening of the road leading to Pastaza
Province; (2) demilitarization of the hazard zone; and (3) a return of the displaced
population to Baños. The Governor was opposed to allowing people back on the
grounds that anyone who returned to the town would be in serious danger. The
following day, Baños evacuees marching from Ambato were joined by groups
from the town of Puyo in Pastaza Province, including members of the
Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP). Between 2,000 and
3,000 people advanced on the military posts set up to prevent access to Baños
and the neighboring hazard zone. There was a brief confrontation between the
military and the crowed. One civilian was killed and several military personnel
were taken hostage by the crowd.
The same day, January 5, 2000, in the town of Pelileo, located between
Baños and Ambato, the Hermandad Baneña and leaders from Pastaza Province
signed an agreement with the Governor of Tungurahua Province that provided,
among other points, for the immediate withdrawal of military forces from the
Ambato-Baños-Puyo road, the resumption of traffic on the road and unimpeded
reentry to Baños and neighboring communities for anyone who wished to return.
The agreement acknowledged that anyone who did return would do so at his or
her own risk, and responsibility for citizen safety was assumed by those who had
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organized the return. The agreement was endorsed by the Archdiocese of
Ambato.
The plight of evacuees from Baños and the hardships being experienced
in some of the communities in Pastaza Province were legitimate causes around
which to organize a return movement. The tourist industry also may have been
pushing for a return when it did rather than wait any longer because of the start
of the high tourist season in June/July. A member of the tourist industry, in
video footage filmed during the January 5 march, argued for reoccupation of the
town with the Colonel in charge of the military contingent on site because
“…we’re the ones who are in contact with the international tour operators and we
know that if Baños is not reactivated within at the latest… by the end of January
that Baños will disappear from the world tourist scene….” (“…nosotros que
tenemos contacto con las operadoras internacionales, si Baños no se reactiva
como máximo como… hasta el mes de enero, Baños sale del contexto turístico
mundial.”) (transcribed from footage in untitled, undated video by PATV
Producciones; researcher’s translation). With mayoral elections scheduled for
March, it was also an opportune time for possible candidates to ameliorate
conditions for evacuees. The leader of the return movement did run for mayor.
His candidacy was backed by Hermandad Baneña, Ojos del Volcán (a group
affiliated with the tourist industry) and some of the rural communities around
Baños. He did not win the election (La Hora, March 14, 2000).
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Economic Recovery
For the return movement to be successful, people had to be convinced
that the volcano was not a significant danger. Leaders of the movement, taped
during the return march, repeatedly emphasized that Baños was not at risk
because it was protected by the Runtún outcropping (“…tenemos la protección
natural del Runtún”); that the hazard was not affecting the town ( “…y en Baños
no pasa nada”); and that no one had died as a result of the volcano ( “…la
naturaleza no nos ha destruido todavía”) (transcribed from footage in untitled,
undated video by PATV Producciones; researcher’s translation). These beliefs
were still being expressed by some political leaders two years after the event.
On the second anniversary of the return and reoccupation of the town, a member
of the city council announced that the inhabitants of Baños decided to return
because they had come to the realization that nothing was happening in their
town, that the volcano was not a danger, nor had it been a danger to them
throughout history (“…al darse cuenta que en su pueblo no pasa nada, que el
volcán no les hace daño, ni les ha hecho a través de la historia…deciden
volver…” (La Hora, January 5, 2002; researcher’s translation)).
Although two thousand or more people participated in the return march,
only a few hundred people actually resettled in town in the weeks following. In
addition to the volcano hazard itself, several other reasons may have contributed
to this reluctance, including the fact that there were no basic services and that
the provincial authorities refused to allow schools to reopen in Baños because of
the degree of risk. Even more of a deterrent, the evacuation had effectively kept
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all but the most intrepid tourists away so initially there was little demand for
services and therefore few jobs. There is some evidence that suggests that most
people who returned early were business owners and the elderly, and that many
young families with children stayed away. A former resident of Baños
interviewed in Riobamba on television explained her position this way: “I’m not
going to return. We have children, and we cannot put their lives at risk”
(interview on undated Chile TV news segment; researcher’s translation).
Getting tourists and residents back to town had to become the top priority
for community leaders. The tourist industry mounted an effective campaign
designed, in the words of one resident, “to convince the rest of the country and
the rest of the world that Baños has been reborn.”

A tourist pamphlet circulating

within weeks of the return read: “Tungurahua Volcano is currently active and
offers tourists a unique opportunity to admire, from the very streets of the town, a
magical and colorful spectacle, one of nature’s displays that can be experienced
only once in a lifetime.” (“El Volcán Tungurahua se encuentra actualmente
activo, ofreciendo a los turistas la oportunidad única de admirar a un espectáculo
lleno de mágia y color desde las mismas calles de la ciudad, uno de los
espectáculos naturales que se vive una sola vez en la vida”)(transcript of
broadcast on Chile TV; researcher’s translation). The volcano then, which had
been the source of the town’s woes, was to become its economic salvation.
In March 2000, a group of journalists was invited by the Municipality to
come to Baños so they could verify – and report on – the town’s successful
recovery. The municipal authorities, some of whom were owners of tourist
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businesses, had accused the press of irresponsible reporting of the hazard and
of having been partly to blame for the economic damage inflicted on the entire
canton. According to one council member, it was therefore the duty of the press
to help the town and its people recover economically (La Hora, March 11,
2000a).
Attempts to show the world that Baños was operating normally were not
restricted to the activities of the Chamber of Tourism. A representative of a local
union claimed in a press interview in March 2000 that about 90 percent of the
economy of Baños had recovered and that “as of this moment about 10,000
Baneños are living in town” (La Hora, March 11, 2000b). The 10,000 number
was picked up and repeated by another national newspaper (El Universo, April
25 and 29, 2000).
In truth, the town was far from “reactivated” and in March there were
probably fewer than 4,000 people in town (Mothes, 2000), some of whom were
not actually living there but were commuting to work in Baños from temporary
living quarters in Ambato and other nearby communities. While no reliable
official numbers were available it was obvious even three months later, during a
research visit to Baños in June 2000, that the town was suffering economically,
with many businesses still closed.
At the time, the town was still under orange alert and the ability to provide
for sheltering-in-place (as an alternative to or in combination with partial
evacuation) was minimal. Apart from the main highway, which almost certainly
would be destroyed by a major eruption, the only other way to exit the downtown
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area in 2000 was via an old suspension bridge over the Pastaza. A new bridge
(estimated to cost US$ 460,000) that would enable faster egress from the
downtown area was only contracted for in the fall of 2001, so it had yet to be
built. Even by July 2002, excavation and construction of a foundation for the
bridge had only been completed on one side of the river (La Hora, July 1, 2002),
and the connecting road, leading away from the area, still was not complete in
January 2003 (La Hora, January 17, 2003). How effective the new bridge might
prove in the event of a sudden, violent eruption is questionable, since even
though it is at street level it would be difficult for many people to reach it and
cross it in less than the estimated seven minutes available.
The data suggest that among people who returned to Baños while the
evacuation order was still in effect some did so in the expectation of improving
their economic situation. The Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study shows that
among a group of people who returned early, 77.7 percent did so because of a
combination of lack of employment and economic hardship experienced in the
place they had evacuated to, and 22.2 percent returned because of employment
or business opportunities available in Baños (Table 6).
The authorities were being petitioned by groups in Baños to downgrade
the alert level, but the governor of Tungurahua Province refused. However, in
March 2000 he did authorize the reopening of the town’s hospital, resumption of
some public works activities relating to bridge and road maintenance, resumption
of telephone and police service, opening of the property registry and of the
courts.
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Table 6: Reasons for returning to Baños – June 2000
Push factors
for return
Suffered in shelters
Lack of employment
Economic hardship
Uncomfortable
situations
Volcano not a threat

Pull factors for return
N (%)
2 (11.1)
8 (44.4)
6 (33.3)
1 (5.6)

Military had left
Home and
possessions
Return to own land
Rebuild community

N (%)
3 (16.7)
4 (22.2)
1 (5.6)
1 (5.6)

1 (5.6)

Belong in Baños
2 (11.1)
Others had returned
3 (16.7)
Employment
4 (22.2)
(business, farm, etc.)
Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.

The Governor’s action was taken with the proviso that the town authorities
agree to allow Civil Defense to train the community in emergency response and
preparedness activities (La Hora, March 2, 2000) rather than letting the local
groups continue to do so as had been agreed to by the government under the
January “peace agreement” with Hermandad Baneña. The Governor’s action
was taken apparently in conjunction with lobbying of the national government in
Quito by groups in Baños (La Hora, March 6, 2000). The opening of the various
offices and agencies required, of course, that employees return to Baños.
Informal interviews in June 2000 with workers at the town’s hospital suggest that
some of them believed they could have lost their job had they not returned to
staff the unit. For these individuals, fear of the economic consequences of
becoming unemployed seemed to outweigh fear of the hazard.
Scientists at the Geophysics Institute, responsible for monitoring the
volcano, continued to recommend that the alert level not be downgraded from
orange (El Universo, April 25, 2000).
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In addition to the lack of work in Baños, another factor that may have
contributed to keeping people away from the hazard zone initially was that the
provincial government would not authorize a general reopening of the schools in
Baños while the town was on orange alert status. The Provincial Ministry of
Education for Tungurahua Province did, however, allow a limited number of
classes to be held so that students from poor families working in Baños and who
had no means of getting their children to school outside of the hazard area could
be accommodated. By early March 2000, there were an estimated 337 children
in school in Baños, 300 of them with the authorization of the ministry (La Hora,
March 11, 2000b). Toward the end of April, the administrator of a school in
Baños opened his facility for classes in an effort to get more people to return, a
move that met with open criticism from the governor of the province. A number
of parents also objected, and they petitioned the Education Ministry to allow their
children to complete the school year, which runs through August, in Ambato,
regardless of whether or not schools were open in Baños (La Hora, April 25,
2000).
The difficulties encountered in getting the town back on its feet did not
deter local leaders, and the campaign to get tourists and residents back
continued. At his inauguration in August 2000, a new mayor, elected earlier in
the year, called for all of the residents who had evacuated the canton to return.
According to a press report, the mayor also announced that the town’s tourism
campaign would be a means of “getting the truth out about Baños and its
[natural] beauty” (La Hora, August 11, 2000). The pertinent paragraph reads:
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[The Mayor] said that he would make a coordinated
effort so that all residents would come back to their
birthplace. ‘The recovery of tourism, with publicity
campaigns carried in the various media, will make the
truth about Baños and its beauty known…. In Baños,
everything is peaceful because the volcano, with all
its power, has made a new source of revenue
available to all families from Baños, he said.’ (Dijo que
a través de un trabajo coordinado tratará que todos
los pobladores vuelvan a su tierra natal. ‘La
reactivación del turismo con campañas en los
diferentes medios de comunicación permitirá conocer
la verdad y la belleza de Baños. ….. En Baños todo
se encuentra en tranquilidad, pues el volcán con todo
su poder ha abierto otra fuente de ingresos para
todas las familias baneñas, afirmó.’) (researcher’s
translation).
New infrastructure would be built and existing facilities improved to
encourage more tourists (La Hora, August 10, 2000). The announcement was
part of a lobbying effort that succeeded in getting the authorities to step down the
alert level. Faced perhaps with a fait accompli, on September 5, 2000, the
National Civil Defense authority finally lowered the alert level to yellow, but for
Baños only. All other hazardous areas around the volcano remained on orange
alert. This was still the status in December 2002.
The step-down in alert status for Baños came just two weeks before Holy
Friday and tourists flocked to the town (El Comercio, September 24, 2000).
Former evacuees were interviewed in January 2001 for the Tobin and
Whiteford study. Asked why they had returned to Baños, 12.5 percent said it
was because of the availability of work; another 25.0 percent returned because of
adverse economic conditions in the communities they were living in; 7.5 percent
listed the opening of the schools in Baños and only 2.5 percent said it was

110

because the alert level had been lowered and/or Baños was no longer at risk
(Table 7).
Table 7. Reasons for returning to Baños – January 2001
(first reason cited by respondents)
Push factors for
return
Economic reasons
Uncomfortable
situations
Forced to return

Pull factors for return
N (%)
20 (25.0) Community and
property
10 (12.5) Work availability

N (%)
25 (31.3)
10 (12.5)

2 (2.5)

Others had returned
5 (6.2)
School availability
6 (7.5)
2 (2.5)
Alert level
lowered/Baños no
longer dangerous
Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.

Efforts by town leaders to get their community reactivated brought them
into conflict with the scientists responsible for monitoring the volcano and
providing risk assessments, and with the Civil Defense authorities responsible for
emergency management. Scientists at the Geophysics Institute were accused of
exaggerating the degree of risk posed by the volcano to Baños. Individuals
connected with the tourist industry threatened to bring suit against the Institute’s
director (La Hora, July 8, 2001). In August 2001, when ash fall from Tungurahua
was intense and was causing serious problems for people and agriculture in
neighboring cantons, authorities in Baños, fearful that tourists would be scared
away, demanded that information about the volcano be released only through the
Province’s Emergency Operations Committee (El Universo, August 27 and 28,
2001). The August 9, 2001 editions of several newspapers show a very different
emphasis in coverage of the event. The national editions of El Comercio and El

111

Universo focus on the damaging effects of the ash fall. The national daily, La
Hora, with a local edition in Tungurahua Province, emphasized that the erupting
volcano was a tourist attraction (El Comercio, El Universo and La Hora, August
9, 2001).
Efforts to minimize the degree of risk to the community may also be
reflected in a lack of enthusiasm to pursue the necessary public awareness
campaigns and preparedness programs. The leaders who organized the return to
Baños had committed that returned residents and tourists would be provided with
full information and training as to what to do in the event of a major emergency.
This commitment was not a top priority for community leaders because Civil
Defense personnel were not welcome in Baños for several months following the
return, and groups within the community insisted that they were capable of
handling any emergency that might develop (La Hora, September 18, 2000; El
Comercio, September 24, 2000). However, after the intense activity and ash
emissions in August 2001, the municipality did announce that its Emergency
Operations Committee would be strengthened (La Hora, September 1, 2001; El
Comercio, September 1, 2001). Peripheral flank communities may have
received less attention. For example there was no road suitable for promptly
evacuating the 150 inhabitants of the village of Pondoa (Map 2, page 36), on the
flanks of the volcano, above Baños (La Hora, November 10, 2001).
During research visits in June 2000, January 2001, March 2002 and May
2002, personal observations seemed to confirm that the potential hazard posed
by Mount Tungurahua was being downplayed by local businesses and
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authorities. As detailed in Chapter 6, hazard signage and directions were not
prominently displayed in the areas most frequented by tourists, including the bus
terminal, hotels/motels and restaurants.

Ongoing Eruptions
After authorities downgraded the alert level for Baños to yellow more
residents did return and the influx of tourists gradually improved. In March 2002,
there were approximately 10,000 people living in Baños, about 70 percent of the
original population (INEC, 2001). The intervening months had seen major
impacts of Tungurahua’s eruptions in other parts of the province and in the
adjoining province of Chimborazo, but Baños remained relatively untouched.
Whenever volcanic activity increased significantly, town leaders appear to have
gone on a publicity offensive to make it clear that the hazard was not affecting
Baños and that the eruptions provided tourists with a great opportunity to see an
active volcano.

Perceptions of the Volcano Hazard
In June 2000, former residents of Baños living in a shelter in Ambato were
interviewed for the Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study about their perceptions of
the degree of risk posed by the volcano hazard. Fifty percent of those
interviewed said they were very worried about the volcano. Early returnees to
Baños were also interviewed, but among this group, fewer than 6 percent said
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they were very worried, and 50 percent said they were not at all worried about
the volcano (Table 8).
Table 8. Degree of worry about volcano – June 2000
Interview
area
Living in
shelter in
Ambato
(n=36)
Returned
to live in
Baños
(n=34)

No

Are you worried about the volcano?
A little
Somewhat
Very
Extremely

Total

-

22.2%

16.7%

50.0%

11.1%

100.0%

50.0%

20.6%

14.7%

5.9%

8.8%

100.0%

Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.
The same study found that among evacuees from Baños living in shelters
in June 2000, many people were still “very to extremely” worried about the
volcano and believed it represented a “high to very high” degree of personal risk.
The same group of evacuees, but not necessarily the same individuals in the
group, was interviewed again in January 2001, approximately four months after
the shelter they had been living in was closed and one year after the town of
Baños had been reoccupied. Many of them were still very worried about the
volcano (40.8 percent) and 45.8 percent believed it presented a high degree of
personal risk (Tables 9 and 10). At the time of the January 2001 interviews some
of these people were living in Baños but working in Ambato and vice-versa.
Table 9. Worry about volcano among shelter residents
June 2000 (n=42) January 2001(n=27)
Little or no worry
21.4%
48.1%
Somewhat worried
14.3%
11.1%
Very to extremely worried
64.3%
40.8%
Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.
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Table 10. Perceptions of risk among shelter residents
June 2000 January 2001
(n=42)
(n=24)
Little or no risk
16.7%
41.7%
Moderate risk
16.7%
12.5%
High to very high risk
66.6%
45.8%
Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.
Perceptions of risk among people who were actually living in Baños in
June 2000, January 2001 and May 2002 were strikingly dissimilar.
Approximately 60 percent or more in each of the interviews were not worried
about the volcano and believed it presented little or no personal risk (Tables 11
and 12). Since these were people who were living in Baños, their responses are
not surprising, as it would seem logical that they would not have returned had
they believed the volcano presented a significant threat. It is, however,
interesting to note that by May of 2002, the percentage of people in Baños who
indicated they were “somewhat worried” about the volcano had increased to 32.1
percent, versus 14.7 percent in June 2000 and 7.1 percent in January 2001
(Table 11), possibly reflecting, among other hypotheses, the inclusion of people
in the sample who had been forced to return because the shelters were closed,
or a growing realization among residents that the volcano was indeed a risk.
Unfortunately it was not possible to verify either of these hypotheses.
Table 11. Worry about volcano among Baños returnees
June 2000
January 2001
May 2002
(n=34)
(n=82)
(n=106)
Little or no worry
70.6%
79.8%
59.4%
Somewhat worried
14.7%
7.1%
32.1%
Very to extremely worried
14.7%
13.1%
8.5%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.
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Table 12. Perceptions of risk among Baños returnees
January 2001
May 2002
(n=105)
(n=80)
Little or no risk
62.4%
64.8%
Moderate risk
18.8%
25.7%
High risk
18.8%
9.5%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.

Conclusions
The economic recovery of Baños required a conscious effort on the part of
community leaders to change perceptions of risk among tourists and evacuated
residents. The initial eruptions and the evacuation stemmed the flow of visitors
to Baños. Without tourists there could be no economic recovery for the
community. Community leaders realized this and started an aggressive
campaign to get positive views of the situation in Baños out in the marketplace.
Even after the reoccupation of the town some evacuees, however, believed the
volcano did indeed present a high degree of risk. It is not possible to determine
how widespread this belief was because so few evacuees went to shelters and
there are no data on risk perception among the non-sheltered population.
Although newspaper articles cannot be taken as completely factual reports of
statements by leaders in Baños, the reporting throughout 2000 is consistent, and
suggests that residents, like tourists, had to be convinced that the volcano was
not an imminent threat.
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CHAPTER 8
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE HAZARD

Introduction
When high-risk areas around Tungurahua Volcano were evacuated in
1999, Ecuador was in the midst of a severe economic crisis that was causing
tremendous social and political turmoil. The ongoing eruptions of a volcano in a
relatively unpopulated part of the country appear on the national scene as an
event of minor significance. One way in which to understand the vulnerability of
the people exposed to the hazard is to view their response to the evacuation and
their attempts to reestablish the economic viability of their community in terms of
the major socio-economic developments occurring at the time. These events
may have affected individual or community perceptions of the importance of the
volcanic hazard when compared with the socio-economic turmoil that had
engulfed all of Ecuador, may have decreased the range of recovery options
available to evacuees, and certainly inhibited the state’s ability to manage the
crisis adequately.
Macro-economic conditions in Ecuador correlated closely with local
conditions because of the country’s relatively small size and because historically
Ecuador has been governed on a centrist model. Until recently, practically all
decision-making was done by government agencies in the capital.
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The relationship between events at the national and local levels was
drawn from an analysis of data excerpted from research conducted by Tobin and
Whiteford (2001) in which evacuees ranked the various crises or problems they
were experiencing. Except among a group of rural people, who had abandoned
their lands because of the direct impact of the hazard, more people perceived the
economic situation and the evacuation itself as greater crises in their lives than
the potential danger from the volcano. The data from the Tobin and Whiteford
(2001) study are presented in the first section of the chapter and are followed by
research on each of the major socio-economic events that respondents had
ranked as crises in their lives.

Crises Experienced by Evacuees
Questionnaire surveys for the Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study that were
administered in June 2000 and January 2001 to evacuees showed that economic
problems almost always outranked other crises, including the volcano hazard.
The exceptions were: (1) economic problems were ranked equally with the
evacuation as the worst crisis by people who had returned to live in Baños in
early 2000 before the evacuation order was lifted; and (2) agricultural problems
slightly outranked economic problems in 2000 among rural peoples who were
living in a resettlement center. Among people affected by the volcano, more
respondents ranked economic problems as the worst crisis in 2001 than did in
2000. In a control community, that had experienced neither the evacuation nor
the volcanic hazard, the percentage decreased significantly (Table 13).
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Table 13. Ranking of crises
Rural
Control
Rural
City shelter
Returned to
Resettlement Community
residents
Baños
(not
Center
(current)(former)
evacuated)
2000 2001
2000
2001
2000 2001 2000 2001
N=33 N=77 N=40
N=24
N=22 N=25 N=27 N=22
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Worst
Crisis
Agricultural
problems
Economic
problems
Political
turmoil
Volcano/
floods
Family
illness/death
Evacuation
Other family
issues
Loss of
home
Everything
Other crises

6.1

9.1

12.5

4.2

31.8

8.0

-

18.2

33.3

40.3

32.5

33.3

22.7

40.0

51.9

40.9

6.1

-

-

-

-

-

11.1

-

12.1

7.8

10.0

4.2

4.5

12.0

7.4

9.2

6.1

10.4

20.0

8.3

9.1

4.0

29.6

4.5

33.3

14.2

12.5

12.5

22.7

12.0

-

-

3.0

9.1

5.0

12.5

-

4.0

-

4.5

-

1.3

5.0

-

4.5

8.0

-

-

-

1.3
2.5
12.5
4.5
6.5
12.5
12.0
18.2
Data obtained from Tobin and Whiteford (2001) statistics.

For statistical reasons, the economic problems identified as crises in 2000
were aggregated. They included the devaluation of the currency, loss of bank
funds and lack of money. In 2001, dollarization of the economy was added to the
2000 list. The background of these events is reviewed in the following sections.

Overview of Socio-economic Developments in Ecuador
The Ecuadorian economy is highly dependent on revenue from petroleum
exports which, in 2001, represented approximately 45 percent of all exports (US
Energy Information Administration, 2002). As a result of this dependence, even
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small changes in world prices can have big impacts on government revenues.
In the early 1990s, Ecuador had benefited from high oil prices but within a few
years the price for Ecuadorian crude began falling, resulting in inflation and fiscal
deficits. By 1998, Ecuador was spending more on imports than it was receiving
in export revenues. The combination of economic factors and an unstable
political situation resulted in less domestic and foreign investment. In 1998 the
world price for petroleum dropped dramatically (Figure 5). The change between
1997 and 1999, when the per barrel price reached a low of $8.50, represented a
drop of 62.8 percent. Ecuador could not compensate for the decrease in
revenues by increasing production (FAO, 2001).
Figure 5. Ecuador crude petroleum prices: 1997-2001
Ecuador crude petroleum prices
1997-2001
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Data obtained from: U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2002) statistics.
Note: Prices are those in effect at the start of the year.
The Ecuadorian economy was also negatively impacted in 1997-1998 by
the effects of a natural hazard. An El Niño episode caused extensive flooding
120

and destruction of infrastructure and housing in coastal areas. The total cost of
the damage was estimated at US$2,869 million (World Bank, 2001), or
approximately 14.5 percent of 1998 gross domestic product. For comparison
purposes, Hurricane Opal in 1995 in the United States resulted in similar
damages: $3,000 million (1995 dollars) (Jarrell et al., 2001). Opal was the fifth
most costly hurricane in U.S. history, but the $3,000 million figure represented a
mere 0.04 percent of 1995 GDP (GDP data from Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2002). In addition to the widespread infrastructure damage and loss of housing,
the 1997-1998 El Niño event caused food production to fall because of extensive
damage to crops especially (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Growth in food production: 1995-2000
Growth in food production
1995-2000
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Data obtained from ECLAC (2001) statistics.
As the economy worsened, a number of banks failed, due in part to the
economic crisis but also because of shaky loans and, in some cases, outright
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theft and corruption. In March 1999, in order to stop a run on the banks, the
government declared a bank holiday and froze demand and savings deposits for
a six-month period and time deposits for one year at all banking institutions
(ECLAC, 2000). The move affected all social classes but especially the middle
class. The freezing of bank accounts was one of the problems identified by
many evacuees as a crisis that had affected them more than the volcano and the
evacuation.
Cutting government expenditures and efforts to increase revenues were
not enough to stave off the crisis. In September 1999 Ecuador announced it
could not make interest payments on part of its international debt (Janes, 2000;
Bronstein, 1999).
For several years foreign debt had been taking up about 41 percent of
government expenditures, leaving little to spend on education, healthcare or
other vital social programs. For example, in 2000 foreign debt service amounted
to 33.4 percent of GDP, approximately US$2,124.3 million (Bureau of Economic
and Business Affairs, 2001). This was considerably more than government
expenditures on social programs that year. Public spending on health, for
instance, decreased from 1.8 percent of GDP in 1995 to 0.9 percent in 1998 and
while the percentage remained the same in 1999 and 2000, GDP decreased
significantly those years resulting in smaller budgets for health expenditures
(ECLAC, 2001) (Figures 7 and 8).
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Figure 7. Public expenditures on health: 1995-2000
Public expenditures on health: 1995-2000
(as a percentage of GDP)
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Data obtained from ECLAC (2001) statistics.
Figure 8. Gross domestic product: 1995-2000
Gross domestic product: 1995-2000
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Data obtained from ECLAC (2001) statistics.
A new president, elected in mid-1998, attempted to turn the economy
around by further cutting government budgets, by increasing tax revenues and by
implementing structural adjustment policies recommended by international
lenders, but the economy continued to deteriorate. By October 1999, when the
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town of Baños and other communities were evacuated, the inflation rate was
43.1 percent; by yearend it reached 60.7 percent (Figure 9). Real wages
declined by 67.8 basis points, from 108.70 in January 1999 to 40.90 in December
(Figure 10), a decrease of 62.4 percent.
Figure 9. Inflation: 1999
Inflation: 1999
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Data obtained from Banco Central del Ecuador (1999) statistics.
Figure 10. Real wages: 1999
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Data obtained from Banco Central del Ecuador (1999) statistics.
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Life had become economically impossible for most of the population. This
was especially so for evacuees, who were separated from their livelihoods and
homes at the worst possible time, just as inflation, which had already been eating
away at earnings and purchasing power, was rising even more steeply. These
conditions undoubtedly aggravated what was already an extremely difficult
situation for evacuees and many who might otherwise have been able to cope at
some level with the disaster became unable to do so.
Among the population at large, with inflation out of control and the lack of
funding of many social programs including pensions, healthcare, food programs
and education, social unrest mounted. The announcement on January 9, 1999,
that the government intended to convert to the U.S. dollar was widely viewed as
a move that would create additional economic hardship, especially for the poor,
who constituted the vast majority of the population. Opposition to the
government culminated in a coup d’état on January 21, 2000, a little more than
two weeks after residents forced the military to relinquish Baños. The national
coup was achieved in part by a massive popular uprising backed by a few
military officers. The leaders of the coup, however, relinquished power within
hours to a constitutional successor government headed by the vice president,
Gustavo Noboa (Hoy Digital, January 22, 2000).
The Noboa government continued the previous president’s attempts to
effect reforms, including the elimination of subsidies on essential items such as
cooking gas, electricity and fuel. A two-billion dollar loan package was
negotiated with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Andean
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Development Corporation (IMF, 2000). Ecuador’s international debt with other
lenders was rescheduled.
Part of the price for the assistance was the requirement that Ecuador
continue structural adjustment programs, including increased participation by the
private sector, including international companies, in important segments of the
economy. The loan also called for the elimination of subsidies on essential
services, the imposition of higher taxes and further curtailment of government
spending programs. The Noboa government proceeded with the implementation
of dollarization. In March 2000, the Ecuadorian Congress passed a law making
the dollar the official currency. September 2000 the former national currency, the
sucre, was retired (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2002).
For many evacuees, the conversion to a dollar standard was another in
the series of economic blows they had sustained since the evacuation in October
1999. Besides having to spend money on items they might otherwise not have
had to, such as rent, inflation had also been eating away at any savings and
then, dollarization resulted in further price hikes on essential items, particularly
food, because of lack of familiarity with the currency and rounding-up to a dollar
equivalent of the old sucre – a situation that was taken full advantage of by many
unscrupulous merchants.

Some Social Costs of Ecuador’s Economic Crisis
Throughout 2000, economic conditions for Ecuadorians continued to be
extremely difficult. The dramatic increase in the number of Ecuadorians
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emigrating provides one measure of how desperate many people had become.
By one estimate, between January and March 2000 more than 57,000
Ecuadorians emigrated (Unda, 2001). The exodus was a continuation of a
pattern that had started some years earlier and which intensified. Most migrants
were middle-class and a high percentage of them were female (Jokisch and
Pribilsky, 2002). The money sent home to Ecuador by these expatriates became
an important source of financial assistance for family and friends (Table 14).
Table 14. Remittances from expatriates: 1999-2001
Year

Amount
(in billions of US$)
1999
1.084
2000
1.317
2001
1.415
Source: El Comercio, 2003 (January, n.d.)
Because of the economic polarity of Ecuadorian society, average national
figures fail to convey the full impact of the economic crisis. Even so, GDP per
capita figures do provide an insight into conditions. From a high of US$1,665 in
1997, GDP per capita decreased to US$1,079 in 2000 (Figure 11), a drop of 34.8
percent (ECLAC, 2001). A per capita GDP of US$1,079 equates to just $2.96
per day as a national average.
At yearend 1999, the official urban unemployment rate was 14.4 percent
of the economically active population (the average for 1999 was 15.1 percent).
Private consumption had decreased by 14.8 percent compared to 1998 (Banco
Central del Ecuador, 2002; ECLAC, 2001).
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Figure 11. Gross domestic product per capita: 1995-2001
Gross domestic product per capita: 1995-2001
(in US$)
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Data obtained from ECLAC (2001) statistics.
In January 2000 inflation surged. The rate for December was 8.5 percent.
In January it jumped to 14.3 percent. In February 2000, when the Instituto
Nacional de Estadística y Censos released the January figures, its data showed
that the price of the basic family food basket was $178.75, while typical income
for a family of 5 was $74.94, a deficit of 55.8 percent between income and the
cost of food (INEC, 2000). But more was still ahead: the increase in February
was 11.5 percent; in March 9.5 percent; in April 13.8 percent. It was May before
inflation started to abate, but the cumulative rate for the year was 90.6 percent.
It would be near the end of 2000 before the economy started to show
some improvement, approximately around the same time that the shelters for
evacuees were closed. In 2000, gross domestic product grew by 2.8 percent
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compared to 1999, which had seen a decline of 9.5 percent. Real gross national
disposable income also increased in 2000, by 5.0 percent, compared with a
decline of 6.8 percent in 1999 (ECLAC, 2001). But the unemployment rate
remained high and underemployment continued to rise. By November 2000
underemployment affected 60.5 percent of the labor force (Figure 12).
Figure 12. Unemployment and underemployment
Unemployment and underemployment
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Data obtained from Banco Central del Ecuador (1999, 2002).
The evacuation of Baños occurred during a critical period in the economy
of Ecuador. Evacuees, like the rest of the population, had seen their real income
decreasing rapidly throughout 1999 as unemployment and underemployment
rose. Government revenues had been contracting, as shown by the decrease in
the GDP and other indicators, with resulting cuts in the funding of government
programs, such as health, that are important components of recovery from
disaster. The country’s economic condition had destroyed the ability of both the
individual and the state to respond adequately to the emergency.
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Local Economic Context
Many of the people who were displaced from Baños and surrounding
communities moved to Ambato. Ambato has a population of 154,369 and is the
ninth most populous city in Ecuador (INEC, 2001). It is a bustling commercial
and industrial town, quite different from Baños with its focus on tourism. Ambato
might have offered new economic opportunities for many of the people who
sought refuge there, but because the national economy was in disarray,
conditions were difficult even for the town’s established residents. It was
impossible for the city to provide for such a large number of people seeking
refuge and employment. Informal conversations with several residents of Baños
indicated that many people did find jobs in Ambato, although some believed that
the wages they were being paid were less than locals would have been paid for
the same work. The same sources indicated that other people, possibly only a
relative few, found better-paying jobs in Ambato than they had held in Baños.
About 2,000 people were housed in shelters in Ambato. An unknown
number, but most likely several thousand people, rented living quarters or stayed
with family or friends.
According to the consumer price index (CPI) reports issued monthly by the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), the increase in the average
CPI in Ambato between October 1999, when Baños was evacuated, and the end
of December 1999, when the return movement crystallized, was almost 27
percentage points. For the year, the average increase in the CPI was 69.25
percent, higher than the national average of 60.71 percent. Figure 13 shows the
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average increase in the CPI and increases in selected individual components of
the index during 1999.
Figure 13. Changes in the CPI - Ambato 1999
Changes in the CPI - Ambato 1999
(selected indicators)
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Data obtained from INEC (1999) statistics.
The period mid-October to end-December then was one of high inflation,
at exactly the time that people were first evacuated from Baños and other
communities, and when it was realized that the eruption was not a given and that
evacuation could be for a prolonged period of time.
The economic situation deteriorated further in 2000. The average
increase in the CPI for the year was 90.84 percent, and increases in the food
component of the CPI, which consists of foods, non-alcoholic beverages and
tobacco products, increased by 107.65 percent, while health costs increased by
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102.76 percent (Figure 14). For people who remained evacuated, the general
prices increases and the increases in the price of foods particularly, must have
accentuated the crisis.
Figure 14. Changes in the CPI – Ambato, 2000
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Data obtained from INEC (2000) statistics.
By the end of 2001, about 70 percent of the people from Baños and
surrounding communities had returned home. For that year, the average
increase in the CPI for Ambato was 20.24 percent. Food prices also leveled off
somewhat in 2001, increasing by a relatively moderate 12.7 percent. The
leveling off in food costs, however, was partially offset by a 53.0 percent increase
in the cost of rent, water, electricity and cooking gas; health costs increased by
34.9 percent (Figure 15). These data suggest that, in addition to the very
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effective efforts of the tourist industry in Baños, the recovery of the town was at
least partly due to the general improvement in the overall economy of Ecuador.
Figure 15. Changes in the CPI – Ambato, 2001
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Data obtained from INEC (2001) statistics.
Table 15 shows the breakdown in the increases in the prices of water,
electricity, and cooking gas in Ambato between 2000 and 2001.
Table 15. Price increases in basic services in Ambato
(2000 to 2001)
Service
Water
Electricity
Cooking gas

Unit of
Percent increase
measure
2000-2001
3
30 m
148.80%
180 Kw
57.40%
15 Kg
56.90%
Source: SICA/MAG, 2002.
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In summary, between October 1999 when Baños was evacuated, and
September 2000, when the shelter in Ambato was closed and most people
returned to start the new school year in Baños, the consumer price index rose
from 394.12 basis points to 807.37 points, an increase of slightly more than 100
percent (Figure 16), and higher than the national inflation rate of 90.6 percent.
Figure 16. Consumer price index Ambato
(October 1999 – September 2000)
Consumer price index Ambato
(October 1999-September 2000)
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Data obtained from INEC (1999-2000) statistics.
Most people were away from their homes in Baños from October 1999
through September 2000. It was during this period that the cost of living was
increasing at a faster pace than either before the evacuation or after the shelters
were closed (Figure 17) so evacuees were adrift from their normal support
systems during the worst of the inflationary period.
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Figure 17. Consumer price index Ambato: 1999-2001
Consumer price index Ambato: 1999-2001
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Base year: Sept 94-Aug 95 = 100 points.
Data obtained from INEC (1999-2001) statistics.

Social Conflicts
The period from 1998 through mid-2000 was a tumultuous one on the
social front. Government cost-cutting/cost-containment programs generated
numerous strikes and street protests. The difficult times continued throughout
most of 2001. The following information was compiled from numerous sources,
including the daily editions from December 1999 through December 2001 of the
national newspapers El Comercio, La Hora and El Universo; the magazine
Ecuador Debate (1999-2002), and a review by Unda (2001).
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In November and December 1999, while Baños was completely
evacuated, there was a growing movement that called for the resignation of
President Jamil Mahuad. On January 7, just two days after the “peace
agreement” was signed between the leaders of the movement to return to Baños,
the Province of Pastaza and the Governor of Tungurahua Province, CONAIE, the
politically powerful Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
(National Federation of Indigenous Peoples of Ecuador), called for a nationwide
strike and demonstration for January 15. The same day this was announced
(January 7) some labor unions took to the streets. Two days later, President
Mahuad announced that he would proceed with plans to make the U.S. dollar the
national currency (“dollarization”), and would proceed with partial privatization of
essential services such as the petroleum industry and the telephone companies
as well as partial privatization of the social security system.
In the ensuing days, other social and political organizations, including
factions within the Roman Catholic Church, started organizing, protesting and
blockading the main roads. On January 18, thousands of indigenous people
moved into the capital during the night. Two days of massive protests and the
union of some military leaders with the indigenous groups culminated in the
deposition of Mahuad.
Although the coup brought some political stability, the economic issues
were still unresolved. Throughout the year the country would be disrupted by
periodic strikes and demonstrations. Social protest centered mostly on wage
demands, privatization, dollarization and opposition to scheduled or announced
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price increases on essential items such as bus fares, electricity and cooking gas.
These were not the only topics however. There were also street demonstrations
for the release of the civilian and military participants in the January 21 coup,
who had been imprisoned, and against the construction of a new oil pipeline.
There were also peaceful protests demanding the “unfreezing” of bank deposits.
Some demonstrations drew thousands and involved the entire country; others
marshaled a few hundred protesters in one restricted location. All were
disruptive though, particularly the actions by public sector workers – although the
latter are barred under Ecuadorian law from participating in strikes or work
stoppages (Article 3, paragraph 10 of the Constitution of Ecuador).
The sectors most affected appear to have been health care, education
and the social security service. One of the longest strikes was by employees at
the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguro Social (IESS) (the Social Security agency)
opposing partial privatization of the social security system. In addition to
opposing privatization, public sector workers, including health workers and
teachers, engaged in strikes, demonstrations and work stoppages to seek higher
wages and/or back pay owed by the government. In April 2000, 40,000 public
employees from various agencies went out for several weeks demanding a base
monthly wage of $200. The teachers were on strike periodically throughout the
year, asking for wage hikes and for back pay owed to them by a government
slow in paying wages. One generalized teacher strike lasted from mid-April
through mid-May 2000.
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The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), along with the Ministries of Social
Welfare, Environment and Public Works, was affected by a work stoppage. The
MoA were responsible for managing the resettlement centers for rural peoples,
located mainly in Chimborazo Province. They were on strike for three weeks in
April.
The protests against price hikes focused on an agreement signed on April
19 after protracted negotiations between the government and the International
Monetary Fund. In order to meet the terms of the agreement, among other items
the government was committed to raising the price of fuel, cooking gas and
electric energy, speeding-up the privatization process, and implementing various
changes to the tax laws, including establishing a tax on domestic services (i.e. on
household workers/domestic servants), and increasing the value-added tax
(VAT) from 12 to 14 percent.
One of the most grievous issues was the conversion from the national
currency, the sucre, to the U.S. dollar. This was one of the crises identified by
evacuees in the Tobin and Whiteford (2001) study. As the September deadline
approached for general adoption of the U.S. dollar, many economic and social
groups throughout Ecuador protested. It appeared at one point that there might
be massive demonstrations but the government intervened quickly and
decisively, threatening to impose martial law. A general strike called by CONAIE
did not materialize. On September 9, with relatively little manifest protest, the
U.S. dollar became legal tender throughout Ecuador (El Comercio, September 9,
2000).
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One of the problems with dollarization was that, in spite of an educational
program that the government started in April to acquaint people with the
currency, most of the population literally did not understand the value of a dollar.
They also were not familiar with the coins that represent fractions of a dollar.
People used to dealing in thousands of sucres for the purchase of a small
quantity of a staple, such as potatoes for example, had difficulty adjusting to the
fact that the many thousands of sucres converted to less than a unit of one.
Also, initially, there were not enough coins in circulation and unscrupulous
merchants would not give change or would give the wrong change. Further,
because of the limited convertibility (100 cents = 25,000 sucres) the price of
many items jumped dramatically, as merchants “rounded up” from the old price in
sucres to the new dollar amount (La Hora, September 9 and 23, 2000).
The political events of 2000 had a significant effect on the evacuees from
Baños. The change in head of state at the beginning of the year had a ripple
effect because it resulted in a series of new government appointments, including
several to key posts responsible for managing the crisis, such as the Governor of
Tungurahua Province and the Minister of Housing and Urban Development. The
numerous strikes by public employees, particularly those in the ministries of
health, education and agriculture, created an unstable administrative
environment and must have adversely affected the ability of these ministries to
render assistance. Given the circumstances, then, it is not surprising that rather
than wait for the national bureaucracy to manage the situation, political and labor
leaders in Baños took matters into their own hands. In the Tobin and Whiteford
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(2001) study, among early returnees to Baños, surveyed in June 2000, 88.2
percent said that the government had done “little or nothing” to help people
affected by the volcano. A survey for the same study, conducted in January
2001, showed that the percentage of people who believed the government had
done nothing increased to 94.0 percent (Tobin and Whiteford, 2001).
Toward the end of 2000, the government implemented some of the price
hikes announced earlier in the year. On December 27, bus fares increased by
up to 75 percent on some routes and the price of premium gasoline increased by
20 percent. The following day, some of the subsidies were removed from the
price of cooking gas and early in the new year an increase in the value-added tax
went into effect. As a result, the year 2001 started with mass demonstrations
against the price increases (BBC News, 2001). In a process similar to that of the
year before, which had resulted in a coup, major roads were blocked and
thousands of people marched on Quito. According to media reports, 6,000
indigenous peoples occupied the Salesian University in Quito. They camped
there for several days. Eventually conflicts developed between the police/security
forces and demonstrators in Quito and in other parts of Ecuador. On February 2,
the president declared a nationwide state-of-emergency (La Hora, February 3,
2001). Although the protesters’ demands were not entirely met, the government
did eventually agree to roll-back the regressive VAT from 14 to 12 percent. The
roll-back went into effect in September 2001.
After such an inauspicious start to the year, social unrest diminished
gradually throughout the balance of 2001. Figure 18 shows the steep rise in
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social and political conflict from October 1999 through the end of January 2000.
The period immediately following the coup was calm but unrest gradually
increased until the end of May/early June when wage demands by public workers
and others reached a peak. The peak around August/September coincides with
protests against the introduction of the dollar as the national currency. Protests
against price increases are reflected in the unprecedented January peak.
When only public sector conflicts are analyzed the trend is somewhat
different. The January 2001 peak is missing. Since the January 2001 protests
were not successful, the data suggest that the public sector played a significant
role in events during the period analyzed (Figure 19).
Figure 18. Social and political conflict: 1999-2001
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(1999-2001) (All categories)
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Data obtained from statistics in Ecuador Debate Vols. 46-55 (1999-2002).
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Figure 19. Public sector conflicts: 1999-2002
Public sector conflicts
(Nov.1999-Feb.2002)
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Conclusions
Mount Tungurahua could not have become active at a worse time.
Evacuees from the volcano were divorced from their livelihoods and cast out
from their homes at a time when the economic and political structures of the
nation were disintegrating. The volcanic hazard occurred when inflation –
already high – was skyrocketing. People who might have been able to grow part
of the family food supply at home, in a kitchen garden for instance, had to buy
basic foods at market prices that made many items unattainable. Trying to find
work in a new environment, when the unemployment rate was high and
underemployment pervasive would have been extremely difficult even for those
with the right skills. Moving to a large city, like Ambato, where getting around
might require taking a bus, could be a problem. A small town like Baños can be
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walked without difficulty from one end to the other, but not a city the size of
Ambato. Looking for work might require spending money on transportation – and
bus fares were rising rapidly, as were the prices of other essentials that
evacuees had to pay for, such as rent and utilities.
The economic hardships were aggravated by the political turmoil and the
constant strikes and protests. Essential public services such as health care,
schools and transportation were frequently shut down, or their regular functioning
was impaired. Agencies that should have been deeply involved in the recovery
process were paralyzed. The evacuees from Mount Tungurahua were not at the
center of public attention. This was directed away, toward events that were
shaping the national political scene.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

Introduction
The case of Baños illustrates the relevance of the socio-economic context
when considering vulnerability to disasters. Issues of class and State that
Cannon (1994 23) identifies in his model (Figure 1, page 21), including income
distribution, assets, livelihood opportunities and institutional support, all affected
the response of the evacuees to the risk posed by Mount Tungurahua. The
residents of Baños were confronted with a natural hazard that scientists
estimated presented a high degree of risk to the community, although the
impacts of the ongoing eruptions were hardly experienced in the town of Baños
itself. Many of the less affluent evacuees had limited opportunities to earn a
living in the communities they evacuated to because of the economic crisis; the
owners of tourist-reliant businesses could not move their assets out of Baños; the
economic crisis and associated political turmoil diminished the capacity of the
State to respond to the disaster. Therefore, many evacuees chose to return to
their homes, prepared to risk their lives by living at the base of a continuously
erupting volcano rather than live as refugees, in exile, in extremely adverse
economic conditions, with no expectation that the State would be able to
adequately assist them.
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Evacuees who returned to the hazard zone increased their exposure to
the potential effects of a sudden-impact, violent eruption of Mount Tungurahua.
On the surface, such a decision seems irrational, but people who returned were
following reasoning that made sense to them. The research suggests that their
decision-making was constrained by a series of factors, mainly economic, which
increased livelihood vulnerability. An already disastrous situation – an entire
community evacuated for an indeterminate length of time – was exacerbated
because there was no “safe” place for most evacuees to go to, safe in the sense
of a space where there were sufficient economic opportunities for them to rebuild
their lives. Had Ambato and other destination locations been able to provide
better economic opportunities for evacuees than was possible under the
conditions that prevailed in Ecuador at the time, fewer people might have
returned to the hazard zone.
A hostile national economic environment and the expectation of
opportunities in Baños were the principal motivators for many of the people who
returned, but other factors, specific to the locality, as suggested by Maskrey
(1994), also intervened. The absolute dependence of the local economy on
tourism made the large-scale relocation of businesses and their associated jobs
virtually impossible. For most of these businesses, Baños was the only place
where economic recovery could be achieved. Further, the closing of the road
running through Baños had serious economic repercussions on communities,
transportation services and other businesses in the Oriente, so the spatial
dimensions of the disaster extended well beyond the actual hazard zone and the
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urban confines of Baños. Additionally, many people held deep-rooted beliefs that
helped to shape perceptions of the relative hazardousness of their community.
These beliefs appeared to be rooted mainly in the spatial characteristics of the
location and in the history of the town, but may also have been influenced by
past hazard experience and by the efforts of the business community to secure
the return of tourists to the area. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
volcano hazard barely affected Baños. As the weeks following the evacuation
turned into months, the ongoing eruptions caused no physical destruction in the
town. The people in Baños had no direct, intense experience with the hazard.
The preceding observations are reviewed in greater detail below. The
chapter concludes with a timeline that shows concurrent major events that
occurred between September 1999, when Tungurahua’s eruptive activity first
became a serious concern, and December 2001. The latter date brings the
record up to two complete years of the reoccupation of Baños. The scale of
analysis is local and national. Events noted include economic, social and
political happenings, and a listing of significant natural hazards, including the
progression of the volcano hazard.
Discussion
Endemic joblessness, low wages, rapidly escalating prices, and political
uncertainty already had a firm grip on Ecuador well before Baños was evacuated.
However, during the weeks and months following the exodus, the adverse
economic and political conditions intensified. Apart from the exceedingly
wealthy, every socio-economic group in society was suffering the effects of the
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economic crisis. In the case of evacuees from Baños, the economic crisis was
compounded by the abandonment of established livelihoods and the crisis in the
government.
Baños had been a space of economic well-being, with a large middleclass and a high percentage of well-educated people. The hard work of its
inhabitants, combined with its propitious location and the many foreign travelers,
domestic tourists and religious pilgrims who visited there had made Baños a
small but prosperous oasis in the otherwise harsh physical environment of the
eastern Sierra. Baños also benefited economically from activities at the Agoyán
Hydroelectric Plant located just to the east of town. The main road running
through Baños connected the Amazon region, with its growing potential for
ecotourism and its important oil fields, with the towns of the high inter-Andean
valley, even with the country’s principal commercial city, Guayaquil, on the
Pacific Coast.
Throughout its history, Baños had used its physical location to advantage.
Mount Tungurahua threatened to make this location untenable. Business owners
had to abandon operations that generally take years to bring to profitable levels,
leaving their employees out of work. Further, where could the town’s many selfemployed artisans, taxi-cab owner/operators, tradesmen, street vendors, or tour
guides, whose economic success was due to the status of Baños as a tourist
Mecca, find a comparable location to reestablish themselves? Tourist locations
take years to develop and require increasingly sophisticated marketing.
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At the national level, the political scene was changing rapidly. As
Baneños were being forced out of their homes, indigenous, labor and other
groups were massing in opposition to the existing political regime. Within two
months of the evacuation, one president was deposed and a new one installed.
The social and political disruption prior to the coup implied that the economic
survival of the vast majority of evacuees from Mount Tungurahua depended not
on government intervention or other outside assistance but on the initiative,
inventiveness and tenacity of the evacuees themselves.
It is not surprising therefore, that leaders within the displaced community
were able to mobilize people to return to Baños in spite of the risk of an eruption.
Because Baños depended on a single industry – tourism – it followed almost as a
corollary that groups within the tourist industry would be instrumental in the
return. Many had fixed assets, impossible to relocate. In addition to the
economic distress of the tourist industry, closure of the road to the Oriente
through Baños had economic repercussions for communities and business
interests far away from the actual hazard zone, many of which had close ties to
Baños. The movement of people and goods along the Puyo-Baños-Ambato road
had been brought to a halt when Baños was evacuated and the road closed.
The cost and time of taking an alternate route, through Quito considerably to the
north, for example, made products more expensive, and therefore less
competitive. The road could not stay closed indefinitely.
Only a resumption of the tourist trade could help effect economic recovery.
It is significant that according to the Municipality of Baños more than half of all
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tourists in 2001 were foreigners (Municipalidad Baños de Agua Santa –
Ministerio de Turismo, 2002). Foreign tourists, traveling with hard currency,
would be unaffected by the rampant local inflation even though they might be
perturbed by the political instability attending the economic crisis. If Baños was
to recapture its share of this foreign market and also attract domestic tourists
during the peak season, the town had to get the recovery effort underway
quickly. The eruptions and evacuation in October 1999 had generated negative
publicity that discouraged most tourists. The perception that Baños was a
dangerous place had to be overcome, particularly in the mind of the traveling
public. A number of factors undoubtedly contributed to make this possible.
The characteristics of the ongoing volcanic eruptions and the spatial
distribution of hazards were prime factors. The violent explosive eruption did not
occur within weeks as had been expected. Baños was evacuated but nothing
happened. During the ensuing months, the town experienced virtually no direct
effects of the hazard. Ash fall was light and infrequent. There were occasional
rumblings and inconsequential tremors but no lahars advanced into town and no
pyroclastic flows reached populated areas at the base. The damage caused by
hazards was elsewhere: further on down the road leading to Pelileo and Ambato;
along the slopes of the volcano that bordered the Chambo River; in the highlands
of Quero, Mocha and Guano.
Even these hazards had killed nobody, but periodic floods and pervasive
unpredictable landslides had. In one frightening flash flood, just a few kilometers
away, 13 people died. In other parts of Ecuador both types of hazard claimed
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several dozen lives. Mount Tungurahua, sitting right at the backdoor to Baños,
continuously threatened to do so, but took the life of no one.
Historically, the volcano had caused serious damage and some
inhabitants had died, but that was beyond the personal experience of virtually
any current resident. Devastating events, like the 1949 earthquake that
destroyed nearby Old Pelileo, had killed thousands and had occurred within living
memory.
Furthermore, among those who believed in miracles, when Tungurahua
had threatened the town in the past, the Virgin of Baños had always interceded,
saving most of the inhabitants from instant annihilation. The very characteristics
of the space the town occupied, nestled at the base of the protective outcropping
called Runtún, would save Baños and its inhabitants from destruction, according
to local legend. This was, supposedly, one of the reasons the Dominicans who
founded Baños had chosen that particular site in the first place: according to their
calculations, it was protected by Runtún from any eruption of Tungurahua. The
most recent eruptive cycle before the current event had been in 1916-1918.
Baños had grown considerably since then when it was little more than a hamlet.
Even in 1950, at the time of the first census ever in Ecuador, Baños had a mere
3,000 people. Thirty or more years earlier there were probably even fewer
inhabitants but by the close of the twentieth century, the town had spread out so
it occupied the entire width of the terrace between Runtún and the gorge of the
Pastaza. In addition to this expanded downtown, busy little communities had
built up in or near the valleys of the Ulba and Vazcún Rivers, both of which have
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served as pathways for major hazards in prior eruptions. Would Runtún really
still protect the entire urban area?
Another factor in the development of local perceptions of the hazard may
have been that the eruption column, which could frequently be seen from other
communities, was barely visible from downtown Baños, because it was partly
hidden by intervening mountain slopes and ever-present clouds.
All of the preceding factors are well-established in the hazards literature
as influencing perception: lack of recent, frequent, or intense experience with the
hazard; lack of salience; and the power and persistence of myths and religious
beliefs.
Efforts to effect the economic recovery of Baños, even though it was
located in a hazardous area, were aided by the general state of political and
social chaos. Although a new president had taken up the reins of power, the
political and economic agenda did not change from that of his predecessor:
dollarization of the economy; removal of subsidies on essentials like cooking gas
and gasoline; announcement of new taxes and a higher level of taxation
accompanied by more aggressive tax collecting by the authorities; privatization of
some industries, threatening loss of public jobs; and overhaul and partial
privatization of the Ecuadorian Social Security system. All of these programs
threatened to make life even more difficult for Ecuadorians than it was already
and further increase the economic vulnerability of evacuees. Many of the
changes or proposed changes also threatened a system that was widely
considered ineffective and corrupt but was also familiar and entrenched. Faith in
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government as an institution capable of resolving the evacuee crisis was
undoubtedly diminished due to the instability of the political system.
Before, during and after the evacuation many government bureaucracies
were crippled by strikes or go-slow work stoppages. While many dedicated
public employees responsible for essential services, including health and
education, continued to perform their duties, their dedication and capacity to
respond must have been stretched to the limit. Tens of thousands of public
employees went unpaid for weeks at a time. People working in agencies directly
or indirectly responsible for providing assistance and support services were being
squeezed in the same economic vise that the evacuees were.
Given the socio-economic circumstances at the time, it is not surprising
that for many evacuees the most viable solution to their problems was to return
to Baños. As the data suggest, some believed they would find economic
opportunities there, similar to those they had prior to the evacuation. Others
returned because in Baños they would be in their own homes again, and they
preferred this and the associated risk, to living like beggars in Ambato or
wherever they had evacuated to. Destitution away from Baños was perceived to
be a more immediate and real hazard than the uncertain likelihood of a violent
eruption.
The case of Baños surely is not unique. Wherever socio-economic
conditions limit the choice of viable alternatives, people are forced to make hard
decisions as to the type and degree of risk they believe they can best live with.
These decisions frequently place them in harm’s way.

152

Timeline
First Quarter 1999
January

February

March

3.2%

5.9%

20.2%

1.63%
4.35%
3.01%
-

3.66%
(0.04%)
2.96%
-

14.69%
11.04%
13.26%
-

Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños
Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4

Bank crisis
comes to a head;
demand and
savings deposits
frozen for six
months; time
deposits for one
year

Political, Economic
and Social events

1

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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Second Quarter 1999
April

May
Instability
observed at Mt.
Tungurahua

Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños

June

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4

26.9%

28.0%

30.3%

4.90%
6.31%
5.26%
-

0.9%
1.01%
0.39%
-

3.0%
1.79%
2.87%
-

Political, Economic
and Social events

1

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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Third Quarter 1999
Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños

July
August
September
Mt. Tungurahua placed on technical alert (Sept. 8); Civil
Defense starts public awareness programs; alert level
raised to yellow and official response initiated (Sept. 15);
census taken of Baños population; evacuation exercise
Baños (Sept. 28).

34.3%

35.0%

Eruptive action at
Guagua
Pichincha on
outskirts of Quito;
some villages
evacuated; ash
fall in capital
37.4%

4.03%
4.3%
2.65%
-

0.86%
1.02%
0.65%
-

2.96%
2.0%
2.04%
-

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4
Political, Economic
and Social events

Government
announces fuel
increase and new
system of
taxation.

Ecuador defaults
on Brady Bond
interest payments

Private sector strongly opposes tax reform effort
Transport workers and
indigenous people
strike; government
announces it will hold
prices on fuel until July
2000

1

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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Fourth Quarter 1999
Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños

October
November
December
First eruption (Oct. 5); alert level raised to orange and
evacuation of Baños and neighboring communities
ordered (Oct. 16); first attempt to return to Baños (Nov.
3); last permitted reentry under military escort (Nov. 6);
2,500 people in shelters (Nov. 15). Lahars frequent
October/November.

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4

43.1%

52.2%

60.7%

5.04%
4.43%
5.46%
-

6.06%
5.48%
6.3%
-

5.04%
4.43%
5.97%
14.4%
56.9%
1999 per capita
GDP decreases
11.2 percent
(based on figures
at constant 1995
prices)

Political, Economic
and Social events

Social unrest prevalent among Public Sector workers,
particularly in health, education and petroleum, due to
precarious salary/wage conditions.
Remittances from
Ecuadorians
living abroad total
US$1.084 billion
in 1999.
1

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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First Quarter 2000
Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños

January
Mass return to
Baños (Jan. 4-5)

Other hazards1

Heavy rains

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4
Political, Economic
and Social events

February

March
First warning
siren installed in
Baños
Loud explosions/lava founting/frequent ash columns in
January and February; debris flows through June; overall
mild activity, decreasing through June. Lahars common
January-February.

14.3%

25.8%

35.3%

15.35%
12.89%
14.97%
-

12.39%
14.33%
7.98%
-

5.39%
7.3%
6.45%
-

President announces
dollarization of
economy Jan. 9;
deposed Jan. 21 in
coup d’état; VP
assumes presidency
with backing of
United States

In Jan. cost
of basic food
basket for
family of 4
was $178.75.
Typical
income for
family of 5
was $74.94

Change in government
results in many new
bureaucratic appointments
including replacement of
Governor of Tungurahua
Province and other officials
involved in hazard
response
1

US$2 billion loan
package from
IMF/WB/ADC;
Dollarization of
national
accounts;
Starting midMarch and
continuing
through early
April protests and
strikes mainly
against food and
fuel price
increase

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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Second Quarter 2000
Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4
Political, Economic
and Social events

April
May
June
Ash columns;
expulsion of large
boulders
Debris flows through June; overall mild activity
Ice storms in
Tungurahua; in
Heavy rains
cause floods and Imbabura and
Carchi 12 die in
landslides (14
landslides; floods
dead total); 300
claim 34 lives
people in Quito
evacuated where total nationwide
3 die
49.1%

56.8%

65.1%

8.56%
8.29%
8.35%
-

4.03%
6.22%
4.77%
-

6.48%
4.63%
6.02%
-

Public health
Nationwide
workers and
protests against
teachers on strike
government
austerity
measures
Strike by 41,000
public employees
ends
Pachakutik
Government/
CONAIE talks re Party (mainly
composed of
economic,
indigenous
social, and
Indians)
political
programs break makes
important
off (resume in
gains in local
September)
elections

1

Workers at 14 of
Ecuador’s 18
electric
companies strike
in support of 3month old labor
dispute at one
plant

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
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Third Quarter 2000
Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4
Political, Economic
and Social events

July
Increased
activity; ash fall in
Ambato, Baños,
Cotaló, Pelileo,
Patate, etc.

August

Activity at
Guagua
Pichincha near
Quito.

September
Alert level
downgraded to
yellow for town of
Baños only;
shelters close
Earthquakes
Guayas Province
and Quito

69.1%

71.4%

77.7%

3.74%
4.12%
1.79%
-

1.92%
0.6%
1.35%
-

4.14%
4.49%
4.85%
-

54-day strike by
14,000 health
workers ends
Election issues
Refugees from
Colombia moving
into northern
Ecuador

1

Demonstrations
against
dollarization
U.S. dollar
becomes official
currency
Debt with Club of
Paris restructured
Talks resume
between CONAIE
and Government

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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Fourth Quarter 2000
Tungurahua and
Baños

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4

October
November
December
Frequent mudflows
Low-level activity
Low-level activity
but ash fall in
Ambato for
several days
15,000 acres of crops lost
to drought and freezes in
Flash flood in
Tungurahua Province.
Chimborazo: 30
dead.
Earthquake in
Ibarra, Imbabura
Province
82.5%

86.4%

91.0%

2.65%
1.39%
3.33%
-

1.19%
1.91%
3.26%
-

1.55%
2.73%
1.8%
9.0%
65.9%
Government
removes
subsidies on
cooking gas and
other essential
items; prices rise
dramatically

Political, Economic
and Social events

Remittances from
Ecuadorians
living abroad total
US$1.317 billion
in 2000

1

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
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First Quarter 2001
January

February
Mudflow Cusúa
canyon

Tungurahua and
Baños

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4
Political, Economic
and Social events

Two die at
Guagua
Pichincha
Volcano in Quito.

March
Mudflows
Heavy rain/floods
throughout
Ecuador: 39 die
in Sucumbíos
and Orellana;
landslide kills 3 in
Alausí,
Chimborazo; in
Azuay 8 villages
isolated by
landslides.

7.0%

10.1%

12.5%

5.4%
6.79%
6.72%
-

1.84%
3.43%
2.03%
-

2.58%
1.12%
2.58%
-

Protests/mass
demonstrations;
major roads
closed;
thousands march
on Quito; 6,000
indigenous
people occupy a
university; five
die in conflicts

President
declares
nationwide stateof-emergency on
February 2

A bill to partially
privatize the
Social Security
system generates
social unrest
March through
June

Gap between
monthly income
and expenses for
family of 4 is
US$89.36 (INEC)

1

Unions and other
groups demand
reversal of
December price
hikes

On February 7 Government
agrees to stabilize cooking gas
price at $1.60 and freeze some
fuel prices through year-end

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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Second Quarter 2001
Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños

April
Lahars

May
Magmatic
intrusion in
dome; ash fall
and lahars

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4

June
Lahars.
Heavy rains,
evacuation along
Pastaza, Vazcún
and Ulba Rivers.
Cold (80 to 100 C).
Landslides on
Papallacta-Baeza
road kill at least
39 people

14.4%

14.6%

15.2%

1.45%
0.34%
0.56%
-

(0.06%
(1.07%)
(0.13%)
-

1.58%
0.49%
1.22%
Strike by
health care
professionals
Potato glut results
in price collapse;
farmers affected
in Tungurahua
and Chimborazo
Provinces
(increased
harvest may have
resulted from
suppression of
pests by ash fall
from Tungurahua

Political, Economic
and Social events

1

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
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Third Quarter 2001
July
Tungurahua and
Baños

Lahars

Other hazards1

Landslide on
LojaZamorra road: 2
dead, 1 missing

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4

August
September
Overall
Major ash emissions and
state of emergency August low
levels
14. Baños unharmed but
local emergency committee of
activity
announces it is
in Sept.
strengthening emergency
plan
Drought in Sierra Drought in Sierra
Record snowfall
in northern Sierra
leaves 200
stranded

15.45%

15.95%

18.32%

(0.11%)
1.24%
0.14%
-

0.47%
1.55%
0.61%
-

2.66%
4.55%
3.38%
-

Approximately 4
million
Ecuadorians
emigrated since
1990

Political, Economic
and Social events

VAT decreased
from 14% to 12%
effective
September 1

Cost of basic
food basket is
$292.97; average
income for family
of 4 is $200.76
Increase in food costs in central
Ecuador blamed on strike by
banana workers and Tungurahua

1

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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Fourth Quarter 2001
October

November

Mt. Tungurahua
and Baños

Other hazards1

Economic Data:
National inflation
rate2
CPI Ambato3
CPI Riobamba3
CPI Quito3
Unemployment4
Underemployment4
Political, Economic
and Social events

Drought in Sierra
Low water-level
of Pastaza
threatens
Agoyan
generating
capacity
19.71%

December
Lahars

Pondoa residents
petition authorities
for evacuation
road
August-November
was driest period
in the Sierra in 20
years. Flood kills
child in Ambato

21.62%

22.44%

1.28%
1.72%
1.88%
CONAIE, labor
unions and other
groups threaten
mobilizations in
opposition to
privatization of
electric utilities

1.35%
0.27%
1.56%
(0.86%)
2.24%
1.00%
10.9%
57.3%
Privatization of electric
utilities postponed until
January 2002
New Social Security
Law enacted
Strike by health
workers
Remittances in
Price of
2001 from
Ecuadorian
Ecuadorians
crude dips to $17
abroad total
per barrel
US$1.415 billion
Sources: Websites of El Comercio, El Universo, La Hora and Hoy Digital
(November 1999-December 2001); INEC Statistical database; Ecuador Debate
Vols. 46-55 (1999-2001); Unda, M. (2001); Instituto Geofísico website (February
1999-December 2001); GVP reports (1999-2001); IFRC reports (1999-2001);
Defensa Civil (2001).

1

Other major natural hazards that occurred in Ecuador.
The national inflation rate is the monthly cumulative.
3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rates for Ambato, Riobamba and Quito are
shown as percent increase (decrease) over prior month.
4
Unemployment/underemployment rates are the national average for the year.
2
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APPENDIX I
Translation of Questions from 2000 Questionnaire
(Questions asked of all respondents)
1. Are you worried about the volcano?

F 1 = Not worried
F 2 = A little worried
F 3 = Somewhat
F 4 = Very worried
F 5 = Extremely worried

2. Did you have to evacuate?
If not evacuated, skip to question #17

F Yes
F No

3. When were you evacuated? Indicate month/year.

________________

4. Did you leave voluntarily?

F Yes
F No

5. Where did you go?
(Probes: Shelter first? Then relocated to other place? Friends? Family?
6. Did anyone help you to evacuate?

F Yes
F No

7. If yes, who helped you?

F Family member
F Friend
F Govt. agency
F NGO
F Other, please specify:
_______________
_______________
_______________
F No help

8. Who came with you when you evacuated?
9. Did all of your children accompany you when you evacuated?
F Yes
F No
10. At the time, did you think it was necessary to evacuate?
F Yes
F No
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Appendix I (Continued)
(Questions asked in Baños only – early returns)
11. For how long were you evacuated?

F 1 = Less than a week
F 2 = 1 to 2 weeks
F 3 = 3 weeks to 1 month
F 4 = 1 to 3 months
F 5 = 3 to 6 months

12. Why did you come back?

********************************************************************************************
****************************************
QUESTIONS FOR QUIMIAG & COLEGIO BOLIVAR (NON-RETURNED
EVACUEES)
13. Do you want to return to your home?

F Yes F No

14. Why haven’t you returned?
************************************************************************
15. Why did you decide to evacuate?
(Probe: Who made the decision? Was the decision discussed within the family?)
16. Now, do you think that the volcano is a risk to you and your family?
F 1 = No risk
F 2 = Little risk
F 3 = Moderate risk
F 4 = High risk
F 5 = Very high risk
QUESTIONS FOR NON-EVACUEES
17. Do you think that the volcano is a risk to you and your family?
F 1 = No risk
F 2 = Little risk
F 3 = Moderate risk
F 4 = High risk
F 5 = Very high risk
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Appendix I (Continued)
18. Do you think it (the volcano) posed a risk to those who evacuated? F Yes
F No
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
INDICES OF PROBLEMS – A lot of things have been going on in Ecuador in the
past year. I’d like to know what kinds of things have affected you and your
family, in particular.
48)

Has your family faced any crises in the last 6-8 months?

F Yes
F No

49)
If yes, what are they?
(Probes: Loss of crops, loss of livestock, loss of home, loss of bank funds,
evacuation, lack of money, devaluation, coup d’etat, volcano, flooding, family
illness, family death, other)
50)
Please rank responses from worst to least bad:
(Probe: Which was the worst?)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
52)

What has the government done to help people affected by the volcano?

53)
What have non-governmental agencies done to help people affected by
the volcano?
54)
What do you think the government should do to help people affected by
the volcano?
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APPENDIX II
Translation of Questions from 2001 Questionnaire
(Questions asked of all respondents)
1. Are you worried about the volcano?

F 1 = Not worried
F 2 = A little worried
F 3 = Somewhat
F 4 = Very worried
F 5 = Extremely worried

2. Did you have to evacuate?
If not evacuated, skip to question #17

F Yes
F No

3. Where did you go:
4. When did you return home?

________________

5. Why did you return?

________________

(Probe: Did you return voluntarily?)

F Yes
F No

6. Did anyone help you return?

F Yes
F No

7. If yes, who helped you?

F 1 = Family member(s)
F 2 = Friend(s)
F 3 = Military
F 4 = Government agency
F 5 = NGO
F 6 = Other
_________________
F 7 = No one

8. How did they help you?
________________________________________________________________
9. Who came with you when you returned?
(Probe: Is anyone in your family still evacuated?)
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Appendix II (Continued)
10. Do you think the volcano is currently a risk to you and your family?
F 1 = No risk
F 2 = Little risk
F 3 = Moderate risk
F 4 = High risk
F 5 = Very high risk
(Questions for non-evacuees – Control group)
11. Do you think the volcano is a risk to you and your family?
F 1 = No risk
F 2 = Little risk
F 3 = Moderate risk
F 4 = High risk
F 5 = Very high risk
12. Do you think the volcano was a danger to those who evacuated?
F Yes
F No
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
48. Since you returned, have you had any problems, such as
F 1 = Loss of crops
F 2 = Loss of cattle
F 3 = Loss of home
F 4 = Financial loss
F 5 = Lack of money
F 6 = Devaluation
F 7 = Volcano
F 8 = Flooding
F 9 = Family illness
F 10 = Death in family
F 11= Family separation
F 12= Violence
F 13 = Other
(please identify other
crises)
___________________
___________________
___________________
___________________
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49. Please rank the three worst problems, starting with the worst:

*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
67. What has the government done to assist people affected by the volcano?
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
70. What do you think the government should do to help people affected by the
volcano?
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APPENDIX III
Legends about the Virgin and Natural Hazards
The settlement established by the Dominicans in 1553 experienced the
benefits and the dangers of its location at the base of an active volcano. Hazard
and religion became interwoven in a number of myths and legends about the
miraculous powers of patron saint of Baños, the Virgen del Rosario de Agua
Santa (Our Lady of the Rosary of Holy Water).

Four are outlined here:

The Virgin of Baños had just been taken from her shrine for a street
procession in February 1773 when Tungurahua began to erupt. According to a
local report the statue raised an arm as if blessing the volcano which immediately
ceased all activity and no-one was harmed (Martínez, 1932 in Apolo, 2000;
Guevara, 1995). To this day the February miracle is remembered in Baños
during the Carnival festivities that precede Lent. It attracts thousands of pilgrims
from surrounding communities and from other parts of Ecuador.
Later that same year, during an April eruption, some residents sought
refuge in the church where the statue was housed. The Virgin protected them
and they were the only people saved (Martínez, 1932 in Apolo, 2000).
The Virgin’s divine intercession also helped some townspeople survive the
cataclysmic earthquake of 1797. These people too escaped by taking refuge in
the church dedicated to the Virgin (Reyes, 2000).
In 1886, eruptions of Mount Tungurahua blocked the flow of the famous
thermal waters. The Virgin restored the flow when the local priest, “…as though
inspired by the Mother of God took one of the Virgin’s hands and placed it on the
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spot where the spring used to flow. With great joy those present saw the lost
spring flow forth immediately” (Martínez, 1932, in Apolo, 2000 198-99;
researcher’s translation).

xviii

APPENDIX IV
Copyright Releases
Authorization from Diario El Universo, Ecuador, to use copyrighted
photograph
----- Original Message ----From: "Natalia Tamayo" <ntamayo@eluniverso.com>
To: <lane2563@bellsouth.net>
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 11:55 AM
Subject: Respuesta Diario El Universo
Estimada señorita,
La Gerencia de Redacción de Diario El Universo autoriza la reproducción, con
fines académicos, de la foto solicitada por usted y que fue publicada el 17
de agosto del 2001. Favor registrar crédito de autor: Diario El Universo.
Saludos cordiales
Eco. Nathalia Tamayo
Jefe de Documentación
Diario El Universo
Tel: 593-4-249 0000 Ext. 286
Fax: 593-4-249 2925
La noticia del día léala en www.eluniverso.com
Translation
Dear Miss [Lane],
The Editors of Diario El Universo authorize the reproduction, for academic
purpose, of the photo you requested and which was published on August 17,
2001. Please give credit to the author: Diario El Universo.
Sincerely,
Economist Nathalia Tamayo
Head of Documentation
Diario El Universo
Tel: 593-4-249 0000 Ext. 286
Fax: 593-4-249 2925
Read the daily news at www.eluniverso.com
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Request to Diario El Universo, Ecuador, for permission to use copyrighted
photograph
-----Mensaje original----De: Lucille Lane [mailto:lane2563@bellsouth.net]
Enviado el: Martes, 01 de Octubre de 2002 07:30 a.m.
Para: Jefatura de Redaccion
Asunto: Solicitud para reproducción de una foto publicada en El Universo
Estimados Señores:
Esta es para solicitar permiso para usar una foto que se publicó en la
edición electrónica de su diario del 17 de agosto de 2001.
Soy estudiante de geografía en la Universidad de la Florida del Sur en
Tampa, estado de la Florida, EEUU, y estoy preparando una tesis de maestría
que tiene a ver con las erupciones del Volcán Tungurahua. Quisiera mostrar
algunos de los efectos de la caída de ceniza pero durante las visitas que
hice a la zona el volcán no estaba emitiendo ceniza, entonces no pude tomar
fotos adecuadas.
La foto publicada el 17 de agosto del 2001 se tomó en San José de Sabañag y
muestra a un campesino sacudiendo las ramas de un árbol que esta cubierto de
ceniza. Adjunto una copia del mismo sacada de la versión electrónica de ese
diario.
La finalidad del uso es puramente académico y sin fines de lucro y la foto
se utilizaría solamente en el documento de tesis. Si se permite ocupar esta
foto, se haría con la siguiente anotación o cualquier anotación que ustedes
me indiquen: "© El Universo. Reprinted by permission." (reproducido con el
permiso de El Universo.)
En la espera de sus noticias me despido, cordialmente,
Lucille Lane
Correo electrónico: lane2563@bellsouth.net
Dirección: 31195 Park Ridge Dr.,
Brooksville, FL 34602
USA
Tel.: (352) 540-9746
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Appendix IV (Continued)
Translation
Subject: Request to reproduce a photograph published in El Universo
Gentlemen:
This is to request your authorization to use a photograph that was published
in the August 17, 2001, electronic version of your newspaper.
I am a student of Geography at the University of South Florida in Tampa,
State of Florida, USA, and I am preparing a master's thesis that has to do
with the eruptions of Tungurahua Volcano. I would like to show some of the
effects of the ash fall however, during the visits I have made to the
affected zone, the volcano was not emitting ash, and therefore I was unable
to take appropriate photographs.
The photo taken on August 17, 2001, was taken in San José de Sabañag and it
shows a farm worker shaking the limbs of a tree that is covered in ash.
Attached is a copy of same taken from the electronic version of your
newspaper.
The use is strictly for academic purposes and not for profit, and the
photograph would be used only in the thesis document. If you authorize the
use of this photograph, it would be done with the following notation or any
notation that you might request: "© El Universo. Reprinted by permission."
Awaiting your advice, I am, Sincerely,
Lucille Lane
email: lane2563@bellsouth.net
Address: 31195 Park Ridge Dr.,
Brooksville, FL 34602
USA
Tel.: (352) 540-9746
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Appendix IV (Continued)
Authorization from Dario La Hora - Ambato, Ecuador, to use copyrighted
photograph
----- Original Message ----From: "La Hora ambato" <lahora@andinanet.net>
To: "Lucille Lane" <lane2563@bellsouth.net>
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 1:36 PM
Subject: permiso aprobado
Querida Lucille
Nuestra redacción y en particular el editor de Diario La Hora Ambato, le dan
el permiso para que usted ocupe esa foto con la inclusión del texto que
sugiere: Diario LA HORA reproducido con autorización.
Además agradecemos que nos siga en la transmisión de las noticias de nuestra
ciudad. Suerte en la elaboración de su tesis.
Atentamente
Diario La Hora

Translation
Dear Lucille
The editorial department, and in particular, the editor of Diario La Hora
Ambato, authorize you to use that photo, with the inclusion of the text you
propose, i.e. Diario La Hora Reproduced with permission.
Additionally, we thank you for following the news in our city. Best wishes
in the preparation of your thesis.
Sincerely,
Newspaper La Hora
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Appendix IV (Continued)
Request to Diario La Hora – Ambato, Ecuador, to use copyrighted
photograph
----- Original Message ----From: "Lucille Lane" <lane2563@bellsouth.net>
To: <ambato@lahora.com.ec>
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 9:52 AM
Subject: Solicitud para ocupar foto publicada en La Hora (Ambato)
> A la Gerencia de Redacción del Diario La Hora
>
> Estimados Señores
>
> Esta comunicación es para obtener su permiso para usar una foto que se
> publicó en el Diario La Hora (Ambato) el dia 18 de octubre de 2001. Se
> adjunta una copia electrónica de la foto que lleva el título "Baños
> Multitudinaria manifestación de fé y gratitude" y que tiene que ver con la
> conmemoración del segundo aniversario de la evacuación Baños.
>
> Soy estudiante de geografía en la Universidad de la Florida del Sur en
> Tampa, estado de la Florida, EEUU, y estoy preparando una tesis de
maestría
> que tiene a ver con las erupciones del volcán Tungurahua. Una parte de la
> tesis relata, de forma resumida y solo para información, la evacuación de
> Baños y el retorno de los habitantes a su ciudad.
>
> La finalidad de uso, entonces, es puramente académico y sin fines de lucro
y
> la foto se utilizaría solamente en el documento de tesis. Si se permite
> ocuparla se lo haria con alguna anotación que Uds. indiquen, como por
> ejemplo: © Diario La Hora - reproducido con permiso (en ingles: © Diario
La
> Hora. Reproduced by permission)
>
> En la espera de sus noticias me despido, cordialmente,
>
> Lucille Lane
> Correo electrónico: lane2563@bellsouth.net
> Dirección: 31195 Park Ridge Dr.
>
Brooksville, FL 34602
> Tel.: (USA) 352-540-9746
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Appendix IV (Continued)
Translation
To the Editorial Department Diario La Hora
Sirs:
This communication is to request your authorization to use a photo that was
published in the Diario La Hora (Ambato) on October 18, 2001. A digital
copy of the photo is attached. The photo is titled "Baños thousands in
manifestation of faith and thanks" and it relates to the second anniversary
of the evacuation of Baños.
I am a student of Geography at the University of South Florida in Tampa,
State of Florida, USA, and I am preparing a master's thesis that has to do
with the eruptions of Tungurahua Volcano. Part of the thesis relates, in a
summary manner, and for background information, the evacuation of Baños and
the return of the inhabitants to their town.
The purpose of use, therefore, is strictly academic, and not for profit, and
the photograph would be used only in the thesis. If you consent to its use
for this purpose, it would be done with any notation that you suggest, for
example: © Diario La Hora. Reproduced by permission.
Awaiting your advice, I am, sincerely,
Lucille Lane
email: lane2563@bellsouth.net
Address: 31195 Park Ridge Dr.
Brooksville, FL 34602
Tel.: USA (352-540-9746
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